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WHO SHOULD WIN THE GARBAGE WARS?
LESSONS FROM THE LOW-LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY ACT
Jane Chuang*
"The garbage problem is not a physical crisis, a resource crisis, or a
financial crisis. It is a political and informational problem which
needs to be addressed as such."1
INTRODUCTION
In the late summer of 1972, the State of New Jersey found itself in
the middle of a waste2 disposal crisis. Sharkey's Dump, one of the
largest landfills in the state, was closing down.' The dump served
more than eighty municipalities as well as various commercial and
industrial dumpers in northern New Jersey.' Officials from those
locales decried the decision to close the dump and predicted "absolute
disaster."5 Sharkey's Dump would not be the only New Jersey landfill
to close its doors during the 1970s.6 Sixty other landfills in the state
closed in 1973 alone,7 including the East Hanover dump.8 This dump,
also located in northern New Jersey, closed amid allegations of
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Nicholas Johnson for the insightful guidance that led me to this topic, and
Professor Sheila Foster for her helpful comments. I would also like to express my
gratitude to Dr. William Rathje for inspiring my interest in garbage in the first place.
Last, but not least, thanks and much love to my husband Alex and my family for their
constant support and encouragement.
1. Judd H. Alexander, In Defense of Garbage 213 (1993).
2. The waste discussed in the Introduction is municipal solid waste ("MSW").
See infra notes 33, 60 and accompanying text for a definition of MSW.
3. 102-Acre Landfill in Parsippany Is Granted Permission to Close, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 11, 1972, at 17. In its decision to close the dump, the New Jersey Public Utilities
Commission cited that there was no longer any on-site material to cover the refuse,
which rose "as high as 60 feet and extend[ed] as deep as 40 feet" below ground. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
6. Stricter environmental laws and the filling up of older, small landfills caused
many landfills in New Jersey to close in the mid-1970s. See Dumping Law Facing a
Test, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1974, at 69.
7. Id.
8. Fred Ferretti, State to Close Dump in Hanover, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1973, at
77.
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environmental violations.9 Its operator had petitioned for closure
because of overuse-its garbage intake had more than doubled to
accommodate waste that had previously gone to Sharkey's Dump.10
The Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission's
("HMDC") plan to convert the Meadowlands into a "commercial-
residential-recreational complex" complete with "clean water and
preserved estuarial enclaves"" added pressure to the waste disposal
crisis.12 As the Meadowlands site was one of the world's largest
garbage dumps, 3 implementing this plan would be no easy feat.
Along with cleaning up polluted waterways and supervising the
closure of six landfill sites, the HMDC also had to face the political
hurdles of developing thirty-two miles of marshland that encompassed
parts of fourteen different towns.1 4
Additionally, the HMDC had to meet a state law requirement that
it provide disposal capacity to 118 New Jersey municipalities. 5 Faced
with this dilemma, the HMDC proposed the creation of the world's
largest solid-waste incinerator. 16 This proposal eventually failed due
to environmentalists' protests over the air pollution that the
incinerator would emit. 7 Instead, in the summer of 1973, the HMDC
adopted a resolution that banned out-of-state garbage from the
Meadowlands dumps.'" The New Jersey legislature added to this ban
by enacting the 1973 amendments to the Waste Control Act, 9
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Fred Ferretti, The Key: Getting Rid of That Dump, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1972,
at 81.
12. Dumping Law Facing a Test, supra note 6 (quoting Bernhardt Lind, then chief
of New Jersey's Solid-Waste Management Bureau as saying that "[i]f the court tosses
out the ban next month, we'll have a real crisis").
13. Robert Sullivan, The Meadowlands 93 (1998). For lurid tales and descriptions
of the Meadowlands dumps, including their Mob connections and never-ending fires,
see id. at 93-106. Today, the Meadowlands is home to Giants Stadium and the
Continental Airlines Arena, with a "family entertainment complex with indoor ski
slopes, a surfing pool and a mini-Formula One racing oval" called Xanadu in the
works. Ronald Smothers, Deal Provides Final Approval for Complex in
Meadowlands, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 2003, at B1.
14. See Robert Hanley, Meadowland Echoes to Zoning War, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22,
1978, at E5 (describing local residents' opposition to development in the
Meadowlands).
15. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Mun. Sanitary Landfill Auth., 316
A.2d 711, 714 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).
16. Ferretti, supra note 11.
17. See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 98.
18. David Bird, Jerseyans Intent on Keeping All Out-of-State Garbage Out, N.Y.
Times, June 24, 1973, at 59.
19. Act of Jan. 2, 1974, ch. 363, 1973 N.J. Laws 962, 962-63 (repealed 1981,
amending Waste Control Act, ch. 39, 1973 N.J. Laws 95, 95-97 (codified as amended
at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:11-1 (West 2003))).
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prohibiting the importation of almost all types of wastes from other
states.20
These bans prompted legal action from cities in New York and
Pennsylvania 21 that had been sending their garbage to New Jersey
landfills.22 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey23 centered around the
New Jersey legislature's ban, and defined the U.S. Supreme Court's
position on the interstate waste disposal issue.24 In Philadelphia, the
Supreme Court concluded that waste was an article of commerce for
Congress to regulate and that states could not restrict the free flow of
waste across state borders under the dormant Commerce Clause.25
Thus began the "Garbage Wars, '26 a series of battles between
garbage-importing and garbage-exporting states that have been fought
out in America's courts.27  Typically, such battles start when an
20. See Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Mun. Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
348 A.2d 505, 507 (N.J. 1975).
21. Id. at 505 (naming the cities of Philadelphia and Yonkers as parties); Ronald
Sullivan, Jersey's High Court Bans Garbage Dumping From Out of State, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 19, 1975, at 47 (noting that Philadelphia, Yonkers, and several Long Island
communities were affected by the court's ruling).
22. Dumping Law Facing a Test, supra note 6 (estimating that 20,000 tons of
garbage a week from New York City and Philadelphia were brought into New Jersey,
about 8% of the total waste dumped in the state); Joseph G. Rush, Trash-Disposal
Problem: County-Run Dumps May Be Answer, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1973, at 75
(noting that 300 garbage collectors from New York and eighty from Pennsylvania
dumped in New Jersey).
23. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
24. See, e.g., Robert R.M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause, Environmental
Justice, and the Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239, 1249 (1997).
25. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 621-23. The dormant (or negative) Commerce
Clause refers to the doctrine under which states can legislate in areas subject to
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause where Congress has not yet acted, as
long as such legislation is within the "restraints" of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 623.
In broad terms, states cannot pass legislation that violates the purpose of the
Commerce Clause, which is to guard the "economic unit" of the nation. Id. (quoting
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949)). Thus, state
legislation will be invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause if such legislation
amounts to economic protectionism that "blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a
State's borders." Id. at 624. See infra text accompanying notes 110-16 for a discussion
of the dormant Commerce Clause as used in the MSW context.
26. For a history of the term "Garbage Wars," see Gary Abraham, Concepts of
Community in Environmental Disputes: Farmersville and Western New York's
Garbage Wars, 7 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 51, 56 n.12 (2000). Although the term "Garbage
Wars" was first used to describe the clash "between garbage-importing and garbage-
exporting states," it has also been used to describe clashes such as those between
developers of waste facilities and the communities they target as locations for those
facilities. Id.
27. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (invalidating the
town of Clarkstown, New York's flow control ordinance, which would have prevented
a private waste management company from exporting MSW); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (rejecting Oregon's use of higher fees for
garbage tipping for out-of-state waste); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (striking down Michigan's
county-by-county ban on imported waste); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
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importing state passes legislation banning or limiting garbage imports,
and the skirmish continues when lawsuits are brought to invalidate the
same.28 Often, private waste disposal companies who have contracts
with garbage-exporting states, rather than the states themselves, bring
the lawsuits.29  Despite courts' consistent invalidation of garbage
import ban legislation under the dormant Commerce Clause,
importing states continue to wage the war to control interstate waste
flow.30
This Note examines the struggle between the states, and poses an
answer to the question: Who should win the Garbage Wars? For an
analytical framework, this Note looks to the Low Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act of 1980 ("LLRWPA") 1 and its 1985 amendments
("LLRWPAA" or "Amendments").32 Like municipal solid waste
("MS W"), 33 low-level radioactive waste ("LLRW") has been
experiencing its own disposal crisis. 3  In the context of LLRW,
however, importing states appear to have won the Garbage Wars by
gaining the power to control interstate waste flow. 35 Their success,
however, was not won through any deft outmaneuvering of the
Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but
rather through congressional intervention. 6
U.S. 617 (1978); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001)
(describing Virginia laws regulating MSW importation in response to New York's
MSW exporting plan); Gov't Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d
1267 (7th Cir. 1992) (examining laws passed by Indiana that made dumping out-of-
state MSW more expensive). See infra text accompanying notes 101-256 for a
discussion of those cases.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 101-256.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 257-75 (examining the parties who brought
suit and explaining how states can use the market participant exception to regulate
public waste disposal facilities).
30. See All Things Considered: Michigan Politicians Attempt to Find Ways to
Restrict the Import of Out-of-State Trash (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Oct. 28, 2003)
(describing proposed Michigan laws that would restrict trash imports by prohibiting
certain items from being deposited into Michigan landfills); Gary Heinlein, Landfill
Bills Head to Finale; the Legislation Would Produce Stiff Rules for Imports, Face
Challenge in Court, Detroit News, Oct. 15, 2003, at El (anticipating a court battle
over Michigan's new interstate waste legislation). These Michigan laws were
invalidated by a federal district court under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
in February 2004. See generally Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Charter County of
Wayne, No. 03-60188, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1868, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2004).
31. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-
2021d (2000)).
32. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j).
33. MSW is also called garbage or trash. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Municipal Solid Waste in the United States: 2000 Facts and Figures 5 (2002)
[hereinafter U.S. EPA, MSW 2000]. For more information about MSW, see infra
note 60 and accompanying text.
34. For a summary of the LLRW crisis by Justice O'Connor, see New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149-53 (1992).
35. See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
36. Congress passed the LLRWPA and LLRWPAA in response to the LLRW
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By the late 1970s, only three out of the original six LLRW dumps
remained in operation,37 despite an increasing demand for LLRW
disposal.38 Because their host states were unhappy to be saddled with
near permanent responsibility for the entire nation's LLRW, they
threatened to close all three of the LLRW dumps in 1978."9 This dire
situation prompted Congress to pass the LLRWPA in 1980, which
gave states the authority to form regional compacts to handle the
disposal of LLRW.4 ° Once in a compact, states could ban LLRW
coming from outside their compact region.4' The LLRWPA thus
allowed states hosting LLRW disposal facilities to sidestep the
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that would otherwise
prevent them from regulating the importation of LLRW.42
Commentators have recommended that Congress end the MSW
Garbage Wars using measures similar to the LLRWPA and its
Amendments.43 In fact, since the late 1980s, Congress has been
considering legislation that would allow states to regulate interstate
MSW.44 The current incarnation of such legislation before the 108th
Congress includes measures to ban45 or impose certain restrictions46
on imports of out-of-state MSW. This Note assesses the strengths and
crisis. See Deborah M. Mostaghel, The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act: An Overview, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 379, 385-86 (1994).
37. See id. at 385. Between 1962 and 1971, the Atomic Energy Commission
licensed six LLRW disposal facilities at Sheffield, Illinois; Maxey Flats, Kentucky;
West Valley, New York; Beatty, Nevada; Richland, Washington; and Barnwell, South
Carolina. Id. at 385 & n.46. The sites at Sheffield, Illinois; Maxey Flats, Kentucky;
and West Valley, New York closed in the 1970s. William F. Newberry, The Rise and
Fall and Rise and Fall of American Public Policy on Disposal of Low-Level
Radioactive Waste, 3 S.C. Envtl. L.J. 43, 46 (1993). See infra text accompanying notes
302-13 for further discussion.
38. See Maxwell Branson, Comment, Should Maine Ship Its Low-Level
Radioactive Waste to Texas? A Critical Look at the Texas Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal Compact, 49 Me. L. Rev. 515, 524-25 (1997).
39. In fact, two of the LLRW dumps closed for short time periods in 1979. See id.
at 526-27 & nn.73-77.
40. See Mostaghel, supra note 36, at 386.
41. Id.
42. See Branson, supra note 38, at 529-30 (noting that the LLRWPA allowed
states to exclude LLRW from outside their compact region); infra notes 339-41 and
accompanying text (describing how the Ninth Circuit invalidated the State of
Washington's ban on out-of-state LLRW).
43. Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs
in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. Rev.
1481, 1551-60 (1995); Michael R. Harpring, Comment, Out Like Yesterday's Garbage:
Municipal Solid Waste and the Need for Congressional Action, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev.
851,888-91 (1991).
44. James E. McCarthy, Cong. Research Serv., Rep. 1B10002, Solid Waste Issues
in the 106th Congress (Apr. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/waste/waste-27.cfm?&CFID=10040316&
CFTOKEN=22283373.
45. Solid Waste Compact Act, H.R. 418, 108th Cong. (2003).
46. Solid Waste Interstate Transportation Act of 2003, H.R. 1730, 108th Cong.
(2003).
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weaknesses of such legislation in light of the results of the LLRWPA
and its Amendments. The aftermath of the LLRW Wars has been
notoriously unpleasant due to the difficult process of siting disposal
locations,47 suggesting that importing states should not be so eager to
win the Garbage Wars because it may be a Pyrrhic victory. States
need a holistic solution to solve their waste disposal woes that
addresses not only their concerns about the waste disposal crisis, but
also the practical difficulties of siting.
Part I presents a history of the modern American MSW disposal
crisis, the Garbage Wars, and the LLRWPA and its Amendments.
Part I ends by laying out the process of siting and discussing how
economics, equity, and psychology impact this process. Part II delves
into the conflict between importing states' desire to control interstate
MSW disposal and the problems that resulted from such control in the
parallel LLRW context. Part II first outlines the state concerns that
the Garbage Wars make apparent. It then describes H.R. 418 and
H.R. 1730, two interstate MSW bills currently before Congress, both
of which propose to give states the power to control interstate MSW
flow. Lastly, Part II showcases the failure of the LLRWPA, which
responded to states' concerns in the LLRW context by giving them
the power to control interstate LLRW flow.
Part III sets out the lessons of the LLRWPA and its Amendments
and applies them to the Garbage Wars context in a critique of H.R.
418 and H.R. 1730. Part III also uses the lessons from the LLRW
context to propose workable legislation for interstate waste flow and
then analyzes such legislation's effectiveness in a typical Garbage War
scenario. Finally, this Note argues that importing states should not
win the Garbage Wars until congressional solutions can address not
only states' concerns about the waste disposal crisis, but also the
underlying issue of developing new disposal sites.
I. THE ROAD TO CRISIS
To develop the best resolution for the Garbage Wars, one must first
understand why the conflict began. As the Introduction reveals, the
driving force behind the Garbage Wars is the MSW disposal crisis.48
Part I documents the many facets of this crisis. Part I.A. describes the
development of the modern American MSW disposal crisis. Part I.B.
summarizes the history of the Garbage Wars by reviewing cases that
apply the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
47. See E. William Colglazier & Mary R. English, Low-Level Radioactive Waste:
Can New Disposal Sites Be Found?, 53 Tenn. L. Rev. 621, 622-23 (1986); Michael B.
Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste
Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 1047,
1050-51 (1994) [hereinafter Gerrard, Fear and Loathing]. For a definition of siting,
see infra text accompanying note 346.
48. See supra notes 2-30 and accompanying text.
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to interstate MSW laws. Part I.C. describes the background behind
the LLRWPA and its Amendments, drawing parallels between the
LLRW and MSW disposal crises. Part I.D. explains the process of
landfill siting, an important underlying issue in the Garbage Wars that
must account for a complex amalgam of economics, environmental
justice, and psychology.
A. The Modern Municipal Solid Waste ("MSW") Crisis
The road to the Garbage Wars begins with the modern MSW crisis.
Problems with MSW have occurred throughout the history of
civilization. In the fifth century B.C., Athens addressed its MSW
troubles by requiring that garbage be disposed of in dumps a mile
away from the city.49 The Roman Empire had the first garbage men,
who collected the garbage thrown into the streets by Roman citizens
for disposal in local dumps." One of the first garbage disposal crises
was caused by the gladiatorial games, which produced more than five
thousand animal and human carcasses each day. 1 The Romans solved
this disposal challenge by dumping the bodies in open pits located at
the town outskirts.
The modern American MSW disposal crisis developed with the
growth of the nation. As cities developed and populations grew
larger, the need for collection services became acute as garbage piled
up in streets, yards, and alleyways.53 Although foraging animals and
the natural decomposition helped dispose of certain types of waste,
waste disposal was becoming a noticeable problem by the late
nineteenth-century. 4  The effects of the Industrial Revolution
exacerbated this problem. Not only did industrial jobs bring huge
numbers of people to cities, resulting in a concentrated production of
waste, but the jobs also resulted in the manufacture of many new
products that would later enter the waste stream. 6
The twentieth century brought an even more damaging
development-disposable products.5 ' The composition of American
garbage began to change.58 The mostly organic make-up of waste
49. Alexander, supra note 1, at 2; Katie Kelly, Garbage: The History and Future
of Garbage in America 16 (1973). Sadly, among the items thrown away in these early
dumps were unwanted babies. Id.
50. Kelly, supra note 49, at 16-17.
51. Id. at 17-18.
52. Id. at 17.
53. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 4; Kelly, supra note 49, at 24.
54. Alexander, supra note 1, at 3-4.
55. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, RCRA Orientation Manual I-1
(2003) [hereinafter U.S. EPA, RCRA Manual].
56. Alexander, supra note 1, at 4-6; U.S. EPA, RCRA Manual, supra note 55, at I-
1.
57. Alexander, supra note 1, at 6-7; Stephen R. Chapman, Environmental Law
and Policy 167 (1998).
58. Alexander, supra note 1, at 6-7.
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became supplanted by discarded packaging, disposable products, and
other by-products of the industrial age.59 Today, MSW includes
materials such as paper, yard trimmings, food scraps, plastics, metals,
glass, wood, leather, rubber, and textiles, as well as products such as
containers and packaging, nondurable goods such as paper, and
durable goods such as appliances.6
By the mid-1960s, garbage had become a serious problem:61 It was
not only unsightly and unpleasant, but also adversely affected human
health and the environment.62 In 1967, a New Jersey court took
possession of Point Breeze dump because of uncontrollable fires that
caused air pollution.63 Similarly, the Meadowlands dumps burned for
years on end, 64 resulting in smoke so severe that it caused traffic
accidents.65 In 1968, a fire at the Kenilworth Dump in Washington,
D.C. killed a seven-year old boy.' The sheer volume of garbage
generated had also become daunting 67 -for example, in 1968, a New
59. Id.
60. U.S. EPA, MSW 2000, supra note 33, at 5. MSW does not include
"construction and demolition debris, municipal wastewater treatment sludges, and
non-hazardous industrial wastes" even though these materials can be disposed of in
MSW landfills. Id.
61. See Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and
Policy 165 (4th ed. 2003) (noting Congress's concern over the growth of MSW and its
adoption of the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965).
62. William E. Small, Third Pollution: The National Problem of Solid Waste
Disposal 37-40 (1970) (describing the illnesses experienced by sanitation workers
because of their exposure to garbage); U.S. EPA, RCRA Manual, supra note 55, at
11-6 (noting risks of ground water contamination, air pollution, and fires or
explosions). Despite their more wholesome reputation, MSW landfills can be just as
toxic as hazardous waste landfills. See Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at
1071.
63. Walter H. Waggoner, Court Takes Over Smoky Dump in Jersey City and Bars
Public, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1967, at 35. Explosive methane gas and the practice of
open burning to reduce waste volumes were probably the cause of such landfill fires.
See Smoke Causes Traffic Jam, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1941, at 9 (describing how dumps
would burn waste to make room); To Take Up Dump Fires, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14,
1954, at 72 (describing how private dumps burned waste in open fires); Stewart Ain,
East Hampton to Dig Up Old Dump, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1992, at L113 (describing
how methane gas could build up to explosive levels in landfills).
64. Sullivan, supra note 13, at 94-95.
65. Meadowland Golf Course Is Part of Garbage Proposal, N.Y. Times, May 15,
1975, at 92 (noting that landfill fires in 1973 emitted smoke cover on the New Jersey
Turnpike that caused a dozen fatal traffic accidents).
66. See Small, supra note 62, at 14. The dump conducted open burns of garbage to
reduce waste and its fire spread out of control while the boy happened to be playing
in the dump with some friends. Id. The young were not the only victims of dump
fires; so were the old. Recluse, 75, Dies in Dump Fire, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1953, at 2
(stating that a 75-year-old man who lived in a shack on a dump burned to death).
67. By 1960, MSW had grown to 88 million tons per year. Percival et al., supra
note 61, at 164-65. This was equivalent to 2.7 pounds of waste per day per person. Id.
In contrast, people generated half a pound of waste per day in 1910. Id. at 164.
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York City garbage strike buried the city in 100,000 tons of garbage
after nine days.68
New environmental laws put pressure on older landfills to close.6 9
In 1976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA"). ° Subtitle D of RCRA1 required the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to develop standards for
MSW landfills.72 Landfills that did not meet the EPA's standards had
to be closed or upgraded. 3 In 1984, Congress passed amendments to
RCRA that tightened controls on MSW landfills with stricter design
and siting standards, obligatory groundwater monitoring, and
corrective action. In addition, states had to develop permitting
schemes to make sure that MSW landfills met EPA criteria.75 As a
68. Emanuel Perlmutter, Cleanup Is Begun by 1,400 Workers, N.Y. Times, Feb.
11, 1968, at 1.
69. See Percival et al., supra note 61, at 164-65 (describing how stricter
environmental standards have contributed to the declining number of MSW landfills).
70. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976). RCRA was an amendment to the
Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 ("SWDA"). Percival et al., supra note 61, at 165.
The SWDA gave federal aid for state waste management plans. Id. RCRA allowed
MSW, but not hazardous waste, to be disposed of in Subtitle D landfills. Id. at 220.
Hazardous waste from small quantity generators, however, was exempted from this
prohibition and could still be disposed of in Subtitle D landfills. U.S. EPA, RCRA
Manual, supra note 55, at 11-7.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (2000).
72. Section 4004(a) of RCRA provided:
Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this section, after
consultation with the States, and after notice and public hearings, the
Administrator shall promulgate regulations containing criteria for
determining which facilities shall be classified as sanitary landfills and which
shall be classified as open dumps within the meaning of this Act.
§ 4004(a), 90 Stat. at 2815; see also U.S. EPA, RCRA Manual, supra note 55, at II-5.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 6945(a) (prohibiting open dumps); see also U.S. EPA, RCRA
Manual, supra note 55, at LI-5.
74. Percival et al., supra note 61, at 221-22 (describing how section 4010(c) of
RCRA required EPA to revise the standards for Subtitle D facilities). The EPA
revised the technical criteria for MSW landfills in 1991. U.S. EPA, RCRA Manual,
supra note 55, at 11-6. The criteria restricted landfill placement near floodplains,
wetlands, seismic impact zones, and airports. Id. at 11-7. In addition, the EPA
established minimum operating standards that prohibited open burning while
requiring daily cover and controls over disease vectors and explosive gas. Id. To meet
new design criteria, landfills were required to have liners and a leachate collection
system. See id. Landfill operators had to monitor groundwater conditions and clean
up any contamination. See id.; cf Percival et al., supra note 61, at 222 (noting that
some small municipal landfills may be exempt from groundwater monitoring
requirements). Lastly, the EPA designated procedures for closure of the landfill once
it reached capacity. See U.S. EPA, RCRA Manual, supra note 55, at 11-7.
75. Percival et al., supra note 61, at 222. Such permitting systems allowed states to
approve or reject landfills if they did not incorporate Subtitle D standards. See id.
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result, thousands of landfills closed 76 and new landfills became harder
to site.77
The environmental laws revolutionized landfill management by
requiring such measures as daily cover of waste, methods to control
explosive gas, and liners to prevent leachate from polluting
groundwater.I The days of open dumps and open burns were over.79
While the changes in landfills were beneficial to health and clean air,
they created a different problem. Landfills filled up three times faster
than they had in the past.80 Because of the daily cover requirement,
the bacteria that helped waste decompose could not survive.81 The
daily cover itself took up space in landfills.82 In addition, the
prohibition of open burns eliminated one of the methods that reduced
waste mass in landfills.83
Together, closing landfills, increasing amounts of waste," and rising
tipping fees 85  created the modern waste disposal crisis-one
76. In 1991, when the EPA released the new Subtitle D standards, it estimated
that 3000 landfills would close between 1991 and 1996. Of the 6000 landfills open at
the time, 2400 remained open by the year 1996. Id.
77. Paula C. Murray & David B. Spence, Fair Weather Federalism and America's
Waste Disposal Crisis, 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 71, 74-76 (2003) (noting the difficulty of
siting landfills). For a definition of siting, see infra text accompanying note 346.
78. U.S. EPA, RCRA Manual, supra note 55, at 11-7. Daily cover helps prevent
fires, keeps garbage from being blown away, and protects against animals and insects.
See Carol Badaracco Padgett, Lids for Landfills, Waste Age, Feb. 2003, at 54-55. It
involves covering waste deposited in a landfill with materials such as dirt, foam, tarps,
or finely crushed glass. Id. at 54. Leachate is the result of rain water that filters
through waste and leaches out the chemicals. See U.S. EPA, RCRA Manual, supra
note 55, at 11-7. In Woburn, Massachusetts, leachate formed a "toxic soup" that
caused childhood leukemia. See Percival et al., supra note 61, at 166. For more details
on the laws that changed landfill management, see supra notes 69-77 and
accompanying text.
79. See U.S. EPA, RCRA Manual, supra note 55, at 11-5, 11-7 (describing RCRA's
prohibitions against open dumps and open bums).
80. Alexander, supra note 1, at 19.
81. Id. The daily cover prevented the bacteria from receiving the oxygen it
needed to survive. Id.
82. Id. at 19-20.
83. Id. at 19.
84. The generation rate in the U.S. increased from 2.7 pounds a day per person in
1960 to 4.5 pounds a day in 2000. See U.S. EPA, MSW 2000, supra note 33, at 5.
85. Alexander, supra note 1, at 154. Tipping fees are "fee[s] charged for the
unloading or dumping of material at a landfill, transfer station, recycling center, or
waste-to-energy facility, usually stated in dollars per ton." 2 U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Decision Maker's Guide to Solid Waste Management, at A-7
(1995) [hereinafter U.S. EPA, Decision Maker's Guide]. Tipping fees may also refer
to tipping fee taxes that states can impose on waste disposal facilities, also usually
stated in dollars per ton. See Chaz Miller, Editorial, Trash Taxes, Waste Age, Apr.
2003, at 122 (describing and criticizing tipping fee taxes). Such tipping fee taxes can
be highly lucrative for states. See Landfill Surcharge Increased $4 to $7.25/Ton,
BioCycle, Aug. 2002, at 18 (announcing that Pennsylvania had raised its tipping fee
surcharge to help finance environmental programs and a $1.3 billion budget gap).
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dominated by worries about capacity.86 These fears, however, were
not quite justified. On a national level, capacity for landfill space
abounded.87 Although many landfills were closing, much larger
regional landfills operated by private companies replaced them.88
These regional landfills not only had more capacity, but could also
charge lower tipping fees. 9 The main problem was siting new
facilities.9" Through phenomena dubbed NIMBY ("Not In My
Backyard"), LULU ("Locally Undesirable Land Use"), or BANANA
("Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything"),9" public
opposition often successfully blocked the development of new
disposal capacity.9
As landfills became harder to site, local governments turned
increasingly to interstate resources to take care of their garbage
disposal needs.93 Accordingly, waste imports increased by 141%
between 1993 and 2001. 94 Not only could communities realize cost
savings from the lower tipping fees at out-of-state landfills, but such
landfills were sometimes located closer than an in-state landfill.95
Also, if their state faced a lack of garbage disposal capacity, they
could avoid the NIMBY problems of siting a new landfill by using one
already sited in another state.96
The regionalization of the waste disposal market further reinforced
the trend towards interstate MSW transfers.97 As small local landfills
closed, waste disposal companies developed their own system of large
regional landfills.98 They disposed of waste in their own facilities,
even if those facilities were located out-of-state. 99 As the volume of
interstate MSW transfers increased, tensions between garbage-
86. See Philip Weinberg, Congress, the Courts, and Solid Waste Transport: Good
Fences Don't Always Make Good Neighbors, 25 Envtl. L. 57, 58 (1995).
87. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 9-11; see also U.S. EPA, MSW 2000, supra
note 33, at 124.
88. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 156.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 21.
91. See Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1054.
92. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 21.
93. See Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 74-75. Waste tends to move from
densely populated, richer states to more rural, poorer states. See Engel, supra note 43,
at 1494-95. The largest MSW exporters are New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and
Maryland. See James E. McCarthy & Anne L. Hardenbergh, Cong. Research Serv.,
Rep. RL31651, Interstate Shipment of Municipal Solid Waste: 2002 Update CRS-9
(2002). The largest MSW importers are Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Michigan. Id. at
CRS-7. Together they receive 52% of the total amount of waste imported. Id.
94. McCarthy & Hardenbergh, supra note 93, at CRS-7.
95. Engel, supra note 43, at 1492.
96. Id. at 1491-92.
97. Id. at 1492-93.
98. See McCarthy & Hardenbergh, supra note 93, at CRS-10 to -11.
99. Id. at CRS-11.
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importing and garbage-exporting states escalated, often culminating in
court battles.10°
B. The Commerce Clause Crisis
Concerned that their local landfill capacity would be hijacked by
out-of-state waste, many importing states enacted statutes to control
waste imports, 01 at times accompanied by heated and hostile
exchanges with their fellow states.0 2  These statutes have included
measures such as import bans, limitations on transportation that affect
garbage hauling, higher fees for out-of-state waste, flow control laws,
and requirements for local approval. 103 Courts have struck down most
of these statutes on dormant Commerce Clause grounds, following the
analysis in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.1" The following
summary of the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence'05 highlights the arguments for and against state control
of MSW imports.
1. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Supreme Court's Test for
Restrictions on Interstate Movement of Waste
Faced with shortages of landfill space in the 1970s,1°6 New Jersey
enacted laws07 that banned the importation of nearly all types of out-
of-state waste. 108 Private landfill operators that processed out-of-state
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (describing the increase in interstate
MSW transfers); infra Part I.B. (detailing court battles over interstate MSW laws).
101. See Howard G. Hopkirk, The Future of Solid Waste Import Bans Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause: Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Department of Natural Resources, 4 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 395, 396 (1993).
102. Id. For other accounts of state hostilities, see Waste Management Holdings,
Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 336-40 (4th Cir. 2001), Government Suppliers
Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 745 (S.D. Ind. 1990), and infra
note 230.
103. See infra Part I.B.2.-6.
104. See infra Part I.B.2.-6.
105. See supra note 25 for a discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 2-30.
107. The New Jersey statute provided:
No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except
garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey, until the commissioner
[of the State Department of Environmental Protection] shall determine that
such action can be permitted without endangering the public health, safety
and welfare and has promulgated regulations permitting and regulating the
treatment and disposal of such waste in this State.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618-19 (1978) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 13:11-10 (West Supp. 1978)).
108. The regulations promulgated under the statute included three other
exceptions: materials for a recycling facility, materials for waste-to-energy facilities,
and hazardous wastes headed towards a treatment facility. See id. at 619-20 n.2.
Waste-to-energy facilities are typically incinerators. See U.S. EPA, 2 Decision
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garbage and the cities with whom they contracted sued to invalidate
the laws.' °9 In Philadelphia, the Supreme Court adopted a two-step
analysis" to determine whether the laws were permissible in light of
the Commerce Clause.1 ' First, it applied a "virtually per se rule of
invalidity""' 2 for laws that promoted the "evils of 'economic isolation'
and protectionism""' 3 by "overtly block[ing] the flow of interstate
commerce at a State's borders."'1 4 Second, if a law did not patently
discriminate against interstate commerce under the first step, the
Court would use the balancing test set out in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc."5 A law passes the Pike test if it "evenhandedly" regulates for a
"legitimate local public interest"; if it has only "incidental" effects on
interstate commerce; and if those effects are not excessively
burdensome to commerce when compared to local benefits."6
The Philadelphia Court examined whether the New Jersey law was
a protectionist law or one that was enacted for a legitimate purpose. 7
The law stated that its purpose was to protect the environment and
public health, rather than to protect its economic interests."8 The
Court, however, found both the environmental and economic
rationales acceptable" 9 as long as the law did not achieve its purpose
through the "evils of 'economic isolation' and protectionism."' 20 New
Jersey could not "discriminat[e] against articles of commerce coming
from outside the State unless there [was] some reason, apart from
their origin, to treat them differently" from articles coming from
within the state.12' Because the law discriminated on the basis of
origin and prohibited only waste from outside of New Jersey, it was
per se invalid.122
Joined by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent, l2 3 Justice Rehnquist
Maker's Guide, supra note 85, at A-7 to A-8 (describing waste-to-energy systems as
involving combustion).
109. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 619.
110. Id. at 624. This analysis became the heart of the negative (or dormant)
Commerce Clause doctrine. See Verchick, supra note 24, at 1248-49 (describing the
"irregular[]" development of the negative Commerce Clause in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries).
111. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 621-23.
112. Id. at 624.
113. Id. at 623.
114. Id. at 624.
115. Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
116. Id.
117. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 112-14 (describing the character of
protectionist laws).
118. Id. at 625.
119. See id. at 626-27.
120. Id. at 623.
121. Id. at 626-27.
122. Id. (noting that New Jersey could accomplish its goals in a nondiscriminatory
manner by "slowing the flow of all waste" into its landfills).
123. Id. at 629 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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noted the many health risks associated with landfills, such as air,
water, and noise pollution, explosions, and disease spreading. 2 4 He
argued that these health risks made solid waste comparable to the
highly infectious materials that could be banned under quarantine
laws.'25 Because the Court had previously upheld quarantine laws
under the dormant Commerce Clause, Rehnquist concluded that the
New Jersey law should also be upheld.2 6
The majority addressed Rehnquist's argument, pointing out that if
the out-of-state waste was "inherently harmful," so was New Jersey
waste.12 7 Because New Jersey still dumped its own waste into its
landfills, the landfills negatively affected the health of its citizens
despite the absence of out-of-state waste. 28 In contrast, the highly
infectious materials of the quarantine scenario, if allowed to freely
cross state borders, would bring with them new and unique health
risks.129
The majority observed that its ruling would also protect New Jersey
if other states closed their borders to prevent New Jersey from
exporting MSW. 13 ° The problem of waste disposal, the majority
concluded, was a "problem shared by all.' 31 States, however, were
not magnanimous enough to see MSW disposal as a "problem shared
by all" and continued to pass laws that would allow them to keep out-
124. Id. at 630 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 631-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Quarantine laws
prohibit[ed] the importation of items "which, on account of their existing
condition, would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death, such as
rags or other substances infected with the germs of yellow fever or the virus
of small-pox, or cattle or meat or other provisions that are diseased or
decayed, or otherwise, from their condition and quality, unfit for human use
or consumption."
Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R.
Co., 125 U.S. 465,489 (1888)).
126. Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 629. New Jersey conceded that once the out-of-state waste was
deposited in the landfills, it could not be differentiated from in-state waste. Id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 628-29 ("But those quarantine laws banned the importation of
articles such as diseased livestock that required destruction as soon as possible
because their very movement risked contagion and other evils."); cf. Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131 (1986) (allowing the ban of baitfish to prevent introduction of a disease
that was not present in the state).
130. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629. The majority noted:
Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or necessary to
send their waste into New Jersey for disposal, and New Jersey claims the
right to close its borders to such traffic. Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey may
find it expedient or necessary to send their waste into Pennsylvania or New
York for disposal, and those States might then claim the right to close their
borders. The Commerce Clause will protect New Jersey in the future, just as
it protects her neighbors now, from efforts by one State to isolate itself in the
stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by all.
Id.
131. Id.
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of-state MSW outside of their borders. 3 ' After Philadelphia,
however, such laws were drafted more carefully to avoid being
stricken as per se invalid under the first step of the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis.'33
2. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of
Natural Resources: Using County Solid Waste Management Plans to
Allow Import Bans
In 1978, Michigan adopted a law requiring every county to develop
a twenty-year waste disposal plan.'34  In 1988, Michigan added
amendments that banned the acceptance of out-of-county waste
unless the county expressly allowed for such waste in its waste
management plan.'35 Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. ("Fort
Gratiot") owned and operated a landfill in St. Clair County,
Michigan.136  After sale of its stock to out-of-state owners, 137 Fort
Gratiot applied to the county for permission to accept out-of-state
waste, promising to reserve capacity for county waste for the next
twenty years.'38 When its application was denied, Fort Gratiot filed
suit, claiming that the 1988 amendments were unconstitutional. 13 9
The Supreme Court agreed."' It found that the amendments
directly discriminated against interstate commerce and allowed each
of Michigan's "83 counties to isolate itself from the national
132. Id.; see also infra Part I.B.2.-8. (detailing other cases invalidating laws that
gave states the power to limit or ban imported waste).
133. See infra Part I.B.2.-8.
134. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504
U.S. 353, 355 (1992) (citing 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 641 (codified as amended at Mich.
Comp. Laws §§ 299.401-299.437 (1984 & Supp. 1991)). The law required "every
Michigan county to estimate the amount of solid waste that would be generated in the
county in the next 20 years and to adopt a plan providing for its disposal at facilities
that comply with state health standards." Id. (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 299.425
(Supp. 1991)).
135. Id. at 356-57. The first amendment provided: "A person shall not accept for
disposal solid waste... that is not generated in the county in which the disposal area
is located unless the acceptance of solid waste... that is not generated in the county is
explicitly authorized in the approved county solid waste management plan." Id.
(citing 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 475 § 1 (codified as amended at Mich. Comp. Laws §§
299.413a, 299.430(2) (Supp. 1991))). The second amendment provided: "In order for
a disposal area to serve the disposal needs of another county, state, or country, the
service... must be explicitly authorized in the approved solid waste management
plan of the receiving county." Id.
136. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 931 F.2d
413, 414 (6th Cir. 1991). Bill Kettlewell was the Sixth Circuit case that was on appeal
in Fort Gratiot and contains a more complete statement of the facts. Fort Gratiot, 504
U.S. at 357.
137. Bill Kettlewell, 931 F.2d at 414.
138. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 357.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 367-68 (finding that the waste import restriction failed under the
Commerce Clause).
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economy. "141 It noted that a state could not circumvent the
Commerce Clause "by curtailing the movement of articles of
commerce through subdivisions of the State," rather than the entire
state's borders.14
2
The 1988 amendments differed from New Jersey's ban on out-of-
state waste because they applied to both out-of-state MSW and in-
state MSW from other Michigan counties. 43  In addition, the
amendments allowed individual counties to choose to accept out-of-
county and out-of-state waste. 44 The Court did not view these
differences as significant. 45  Rather, it dismissed these differences,
finding that the extent of the discrimination did not matter 146 as long
as there was discrimination based on the origin of MSW. 147 Because
Michigan had no reason to treat out-of-state waste differently from in-
county waste, the Court struck down the amendments as
"protectionist measures that [could not] withstand scrutiny under the
Commerce Clause.' 14 8  Following Fort Gratiot, importing states
attempted to justify their interstate waste control legislation by
discriminating on factors other than origin.149
3. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Quality: Discriminatory Fees for Out-of-State Waste
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Quality15° came off the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt151 to strike down
Alabama's system of charging higher tipping fees 52 for out-of-state
hazardous waste.'53 In Chemical Waste, Alabama charged a base fee
141. Id. at 361.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 363. The Court found it significant that the amendment required that a
county act "affirmatively to permit other waste to enter its jurisdiction." Id. at 361.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 363 n.4 (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992)).
147. See id. at 361.
148. Id. at 367-68. The Michigan laws were protectionist because they effectively
blocked the flow of MSW into the state by using county borders. See id. at 361. The
Court expanded its analysis of the per se rule of invalidity by noting that the measures
would be permitted if Michigan could prove that there were no nondiscriminatory
alternatives. See id. at 365-66 (citation omitted) (giving the example of a state's efforts
to "conserve and preserve ground water for its own citizens in times of severe
shortage").
149. See infra notes 150-254 and accompanying text (recounting the cases following
Fort Gratiot where states avoided outright bans and instead used fees and other
measures to achieve the same result).
150. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
151. 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (holding that discriminatory fees on out-of-state
hazardous waste were impermissible).
152. See supra note 85 for a definition of tipping fees.
153. Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. at 338-39.
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of $25.60 per ton for both in-state and out-of-state waste, plus an
additional fee of $72.00 per ton for out-of-state waste.154 The Court
invalidated the additional fee because it was based only on the "origin
of the waste" and Alabama did not meet its burden to show that there
was another justification for the law besides "economic
protectionism. "155 In a footnote, the Court passed on the question of
whether the higher fees could be justified as a "compensatory tax," or
as the out-of-state generators' "fair share" of the costs of Alabama's
waste disposal facilities. 15 6
In 1989, Oregon approved a surcharge on out-of-state waste.'57 The
amount of the surcharge was to be calculated by the Oregon
Environmental Quality Commission based on the "costs to the State
of Oregon and its political subdivisions of disposing of solid waste
generated out-of-state" which were not paid for under other
statutes.58 The Commission eventually set the surcharge at $2.25 per
ton.'59 In contrast, the in-state fee was capped at $0.85 per ton.' 6°
Anticipating a court challenge, Oregon applied both fees to out-of-
state waste haulers, with the in-state fee of $0.85 to be refunded if the
$2.25 surcharge was upheld. 161
Although the surcharge was meant to help Oregon defray its
disposal costs, 162 the Court found it discriminatory on its face. 163 The
154. Id. Such a fee proved extremely effective-a year after it was enacted, the
total amount of waste (from both in- and out-of-state sources) disposed of at the
facility had fallen by more than 50%. See id. at 342 n.4.
155. Id. at 344 (quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 346 n.9 (quotation marks omitted). A compensatory tax ensures that
those engaged in interstate commerce pay their fair share of state tax burdens. See Or.
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 102-03 (1994). To impose
such a tax on interstate commerce, a state must first identify and calculate the burden
on intrastate commerce. Id. at 103. The compensatory tax on interstate commerce
must be shown to "roughly... approximate" the burden experienced by intrastate
commerce. Id. In the case of Alabama, for example, any costs associated with waste
disposal that were borne by in-state dumpers but not out-of-state dumpers could be
captured by the compensatory tax. See id. (quoting Justice Cardozo's depiction of a
compensatory tax scheme). Such costs might include a surcharge imposed on
intrastate dumping, but not on interstate dumping. See id. at 104 (finding that Oregon
did not charge a fee to shippers of in-state waste that would justify a compensatory
tax on out-of-state waste).
157. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 96. The surcharge was assessed on "every person
who disposes of solid waste generated out-of-state in a disposal site or regional
disposal site." Id. (citing Or. Rev. Stat § 459.297(1) (1993) (repealed 1995) (quotation
marks omitted)).
158. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
159. Id. (citing Or. Admin. R. 340-97-120(7) (1993)).
160. Id. (citing Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 459A.110(5), 115 (1991) (amended 1993)).
161. Id. at 96 & n.2 (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 459A.110(6) and 1991 Or. Laws 385, §§
91-92).
162. Id. at 109 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (detailing the identified costs that
the surcharge was based on, including state activities to improve waste management,
increased environmental liability, lost disposal capacity, and nuisance impacts from
transportation).
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Court emphasized that the state needed a valid reason to differentiate
out-of-state waste from in-state waste."6 The Court further found that
the $2.25 per ton surcharge did not calculate costs that were specific to
out-of-state waste because the disposal cost of such waste was the
same as for in-state waste.165 The $2.25 per ton surcharge also applied
to in-state haulers who shipped in out-of-state waste, refuting
Oregon's argument that in-state haulers already paid a surcharge
through general state taxes.166 Because Oregon could offer "no
legitimate reason" for the higher fee charged on out-of-state waste,
the Court invalidated the surcharge. 67
In Philadelphia, Fort Gratiot, and Oregon Waste Systems, importing
states failed in their attempts to control interstate waste flow through
prohibitions on MSW imports16s and discriminatory fees. 169 In C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown,170 however, the town of Clarkstown, New
York approached the waste flow problem using the opposite tactic.17" '
Clarkstown passed a flow control law 7' requiring that all MSW within
its borders be processed at its waste transfer station,'73 allowing the
town to effectively keep all of its MSW to itself.17 4
163. Id. at 99.
164. Id. at 101 (noting that higher costs associated with out-of-state waste or unique
health risks stemming from out-of-state waste could be possible justifications for the
surcharge).
165. Id. at 101 n.5.
166. Id. at 105.
167. Id. at 108.
168. See supra notes 106-49 and accompanying text (summarizing the holdings of
Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot).
169. See supra notes 150-67 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in
Oregon Waste Systems).
170. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
171. Id. at 387 (describing how Clarkstown enacted a flow control ordinance).
Flow control laws are a type of waste import restriction that work like an import ban
in reverse. See Lincoln L. Davies, Note, If You Give the Court a Commerce Clause:
An Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate Waste Jurisprudence,
11 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 207, 240-41 (1999). Rather than keeping waste out, flow
control laws require that all waste within a certain area be processed at a designated
facility. Id. This allows towns to raise money by charging fees on the waste processed
at their facility. See id. at 241. In Carbone, Clarkstown charged an above-market
price for waste processing and used the money to finance its new waste transfer
station. 511 U.S. at 387.
172. See supra note 171 (explaining how flow control laws operate).
173. The trend towards regional waste disposal spawned the development of waste
transfer stations. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Waste Transfer Stations: A
Guide for Decision-Making 2 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. EPA, Waste Transfer Stations].
These stations take solid waste from garbage collection trucks and consolidate it for
shipment to an appropriate end facility, such as a landfill or waste-to-energy plant. Id.
Waste transfer stations help communities save on costs when waste is to be
transported long distances. Id. at 3 (describing the reduction in hauling costs when
smaller loads of MSW from collection trucks are consolidated for transport by a
larger transfer vehicle). They also allow for screening of waste and can serve as a
drop-off center for other types of waste, such as recyclables, electronics, and
household hazardous wastes. Id. at 3-4. The cost-effectiveness of such stations
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4. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown: Flow Control Laws to Keep
Trash In-State
Clarkstown contracted with a private company to construct and
operate a waste transfer station'75 for five years, after which the town
would buy the facility for one dollar.17 6  To finance the station,
Clarkstown planned to use income from the tipping fee charged to
haulers who brought their waste to the station for processing.' 71
Clarkstown promised to provide a minimum waste flow of 120,000
tons per year, or it would pay the tipping fee to make up the
difference. 78 At $81 per ton, the tipping fee was above the market
price for waste disposal. 179 To ensure that it met its minimum waste
flow needs despite the high tipping fee, Clarkstown passed an
ordinance that required all nonhazardous solid waste in the town to be
processed at the transfer station. 80
C & A Carbone, Inc. ("Carbone") owned a recycling facility in
Clarkstown where it processed bulk solid waste in a similar fashion to
the waste transfer station. 81 Under the ordinance, Carbone had to
bring any nonrecyclable waste to the waste transfer station and pay
the $81 per ton tipping fee even though it had already sorted the
waste."8  Carbone ignored the ordinance and was caught shipping
waste from its facility to out-of-state landfills following a traffic
accident involving one of its trash haulers.'83 When Clarkstown
depends in part on the amount of waste processed. Id. at 4. To ensure that stations
received enough waste for cost-efficient disposal, many communities enacted flow
control laws. Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 84; see also supra note 171 for a
discussion of flow control laws.
174. See Davies, supra note 171, at 240-41 (discussing flow control laws). By
exerting control over waste in this way, Clarkstown effectively kept other waste
management companies based there from exporting waste. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at
388. In addition, haulers from outside of town were given an incentive to stay away
from Clarkstown to avoid being made to pay its above-market tipping fee. See id. at
387 (noting that Clarkstown's tipping fee was higher than market).
175. For more information on waste transfer stations, see supra note 173.
176. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387.
177. Id.
178. Id. To reach this minimum, Clarkstown passed a flow control law that applied
to waste generated in the town and waste generated outside the town and brought in.
See id. (citing Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., Local Laws 1990, No. 9, §§ 3.C, 5.A,
applying to in-town waste and out-of-town waste brought into town, respectively).
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Local Laws 1990, No. 9 of the Town of Clarkstown). For the full
version of the ordinance, see id. at 395-400.
181. Id. at 387-88.
182. Id. at 388.
183. Id. The Court described the accident as follows:
In March 1991, a tractor-trailer containing 23 bales of solid waste struck an
overpass on the Palisades Interstate Parkway. When the police investigated
the accident, they discovered the truck was carrying household waste from
Carbone's Clarkstown plant to an Indiana landfill. The Clarkstown police
put Carbone's plant under surveillance and in the next few days seized six
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sought to enforce the ordinance," Carbone challenged the law's
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. 185
The Supreme Court invalidated the law in Carbone.'86 The Court
pointed out two ways that the law affected interstate commerce. 187
First, the waste that Carbone processed came from both local and out-
of-state sources. 88 Second, the designated waste transfer station was
given a monopoly on processing waste and deprived outside
businesses from accessing the "local market."'89 The Court found that
the ordinance discriminated against interstate commerce by
"allow[ing] only the favored operator to process waste ... within the
limits of the town." 190 The Court cited previous cases where it had
struck down local processing requirements that "bar[red] the import
of the processing service."' 9'
Although a discriminatory law was per se invalid under the first step
of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause analysis,' 92 such a law could
still stand if there were no other alternatives to advance legitimate
local interests. 193 The Court dismissed Clarkstown's argument that the
flow control law remained valid under this exception, finding that the
town could have used nondiscriminatory methods to fulfill the
purposes of the ordinance. 94 In addition, Clarkstown did not need to
use the tipping fees to finance the waste transfer plant as it could use
the mechanisms of municipal bonds and taxes195 Thus, the Court
concluded that the flow control ordinance violated the Commerce
Clause.1 96
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor advocated using the Pike
more tractor-trailers leaving the facility. The trucks also contained
nonrecyclable waste, originating both within and without the town, and
destined for disposal sites in Illinois, Indiana, West Virginia, and Florida.
Id.
184. Id. The penalty for violating the ordinance was a fine up to $1000 and up to
fifteen days in jail. Id. at 387 (citing Town of Clarkston, N.Y., Local Law No. 9, § 7).
In its suit, Carbone sought to enjoin Clarkstown from continuing its activities. Id. at
388.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 385-86.
187. Id. at 389.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 391.
191. Id. at 392.
192. For a summary of the Supreme Court's two-step analysis under the dormant
Commerce Clause, see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
193. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392; see also supra note 148 (noting the Court's
discussion of the no nondiscriminatory alternatives test in Fort Gratiot).
194. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393 (suggesting that Clarkstown use an alternative such
as enacting a uniform safety regulation that would ensure that waste disposal
companies like Carbone did not "underprice the market by cutting corners on
environmental safety").
195. Id. at 393-94.
196. Id. at 385-86.
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balancing test from the second step of the Philadelphia dormant
Commerce Clause analysis."7 In her view, the flow control law did
not discriminate because it treated in-town and out-of-town
processors equally.' Thus, the Court should have examined the law
to find out whether its incidental effects on commerce were "an
excessive burden" compared to the local benefits.'99 The benefits of
the flow control law included economic efficiency and proper
disposal.2°°  Applying the Pike test, Justice O'Connor found that
Clarkstown could achieve both benefits using less burdensome means,
such as market tools, municipal financing strategies, and higher
processing standards.20' She additionally noted that flow control laws
could create conflicting policies between states that would make it
impossible for haulers to comply fully with both states' laws.22 After
balancing the burdens and benefits of the ordinance, Justice
O'Connor concluded that it was invalid.
20 3
By striking the flow control law in Carbone, the Supreme Court
demonstrated its commitment to ensure an "unobstructed flow" of
MSW across state borders in both directions-keeping garbage out or
keeping it in.2 4 Lower courts have adhered to the Supreme Court's
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence for interstate MSW disposal
as laid out in the Philadelphia, Fort Gratiot, Oregon Waste Systems,
and Carbone cases.205  Their holdings, however, have not deterred
importing states from trying more creative methods of control such as
facially nondiscriminatory laws.20 6
197. Id. at 401-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra notes 115-16 (explaining the
Pike test).
198. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 404 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 405 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 407 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 393. The Supreme Court's invalidation of the flow control law in
Carbone had repercussions for states such as New Jersey, which had invested in
expensive waste-to-energy plants and enacted flow control laws to obtain the large
volumes of waste needed to remain in operation. See McCarthy & Hardenbergh,
supra note 93, at CRS-8; Jennifer Preston, New Jersey's Landfills Want the Right Stuff,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1998, § 1, at 58 (describing the large debts and under-utilization
of New Jersey's trash centers and incinerators due to the invalidation of laws
requiring localities to dispose of their own waste in their borders). Since local
communities have chosen to dispose of their waste outside of the state, New Jersey
has become one of the largest importers of MSW in its efforts to meet the capacity
requirements of its waste facilities. McCarthy & Hardenbergh, supra note 93, at CRS-
8. New Jersey currently imports large amounts of MSW from New York to fill these
demands. Id.
205. Verchick, supra note 24, at 1266; cf Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 89
(noting that federal courts preempt local laws regulating waste disposal 62% of the
time while state courts preempt them 34% of the time).
206. Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 86-89; see also infra notes 207-54 and
accompanying text (describing interstate waste control laws in Indiana and Virginia).
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5. Government Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh:
Regulating Transportation Methods
Indiana passed a "backhaul ban" that allowed waste-carrying trucks
to transport only a few other types of materials.0 7 In conjunction with
this ban, Indiana required that such trucks register with the Indiana
Department of Environmental Management and be marked with an
identification sticker.2 8 Backhauling meant that trucks carrying goods
from the Midwest to the Northeast would carry back waste on the
return trip from the Northeast to the Midwest.2 9 Backhauling was a
reviled practice, and companies did not willingly allow their goods to
be shipped in trucks that had carried waste. 210 Accordingly, truckers
would not voluntarily tell shippers if their vehicles were used for
backhauling.21I Despite pressure from their customers to stop
backhauling, many trucking companies still continued the practice. 12
Indiana's backhauling ban effectively forced trucking companies to
use a "semi-dedicated fleet[]" of waste hauling trucks. 13
In Government Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh,
companies that brokered the transportation of out-of-state MSW to
Indiana landfills challenged the backhaul ban and its related
provisions.1 In deciding whether to invalidate the ban under the
virtually per se rule of invalidity under the first step of the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, 15 the Seventh Circuit extended its review
of the backhaul ban beyond facial discrimination.216 It examined the
"practical effect of the statutes ... on interstate commerce. '"217
207. Gov't Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1270 (7th
Cir. 1992). Besides waste, trucks could transport "[w]ood, concrete, brick, and other
construction and demolition materials"; "[d]irt, sand, gravel, asphalt, salt, and other
highway maintenance material"; and "[c]oal, gypsum, slag, scrap metal, and other
bulk industrial commodities." Id.
208. Id. at 1270-71.
209. Id. at 1272.
210. Id. at 1272-73. Companies feared adverse impacts on their products'
reputations. Id.
211. Id. (citing testimony from a trucker).
212. Id. (noting that small trucking companies were especially willing to backhaul
because they needed to use their trucks efficiently).
213. Id. at 1270.
214. Id. at 1269-70. The companies brokered the transport of waste from New
York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania to Indiana. Id.
215. See supra notes 110-16 (discussing the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce
Clause analysis).
216. Bayh, 975 F.2d at 1278. The court explained its test as follows:
However, a determination that a statute does not discriminate on its face
and "purports to regulate evenhandedly" does not end the question of which
scrutiny should apply. When a statute discriminates "in practical effect"
against interstate commerce, the fact that it purports to apply equally to





Backhauling allowed the plaintiff companies to cut their trucking costs
in half.218 If the ban was allowed to stand, the court estimated that the
resulting cost of disposing New York waste would be $85 per ton
compared to $50 per ton under backhauling.2 19 Although $85 was still
lower than the $125 per ton tipping fee charged by landfills in the New
York region,20 the increase meant that Indiana would no longer be a
cost-effective place for waste disposal.22' Indiana itself would not be
affected by the backhaul ban since it already shipped its waste using
dedicated garbage trucks.222
Considering all of these factors, the Seventh Circuit found that the
"practical impact of the backhaul ban would be to reduce very
significantly the inflow of out-of-state waste by raising the cost of
disposing of such waste in Indiana. ' 223 Thus, the backhaul ban was
per se invalid under the first step of the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis because it discriminated against out-of-state waste in practical
effect.224 Unless Indiana could show that the ban "further[ed] health
and safety concerns that [could not] be adequately served by
nondiscriminatory alternatives," the law would be invalidated.2 5
Indiana argued that the backhaul ban benefited public health by
ensuring that goods would not be contaminated by waste and
protected the reputation of goods manufactured in-state. 26 The
Seventh Circuit found these reasons insufficient because Indiana did
not prove the lack of other alternatives and did not offer any evidence
of illnesses resulting from backhauling.227 Thus, because the backhaul
ban was "an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State with the
entire burden of slowing the flow of refuse in to [its] remaining landfill
sites," the court invalidated the law.228
6. Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore: Capping the
Amount of Waste a Landfill Can Accept
In another example of states' creative attempts to control the flow
of interstate waste, Virginia enacted a barrage of statutes229 in 1999 to
218. Id. at 1273.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1273 & n.6 (noting that tipping fees in eastern landfills were $125 a ton
and were more expensive than tipping fees in Indiana).
221. Id. (reasoning that trash haulers would no longer choose Indiana for disposal
services and that the ban would eliminate interstate transport of waste to Indiana).
222. Id. at 1279.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Res., 504 U.S. 353, 366 (1992)).
225. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 366).
226. Id. at 1280.
227. Id. at 1280 & n.9.
228. Id. at 1281 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978)).
229. The statutes included five provisions: 1) a cap on the amount of waste that
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fight a flood of imported garbage from New York City23° resulting
from the closure of New York's Fresh Kills landfill.231 One of these
statutes capped the amount of garbage that any landfill in Virginia
could accept to the greater of 2000 tons per day or the average
amount accepted in 1998.232 In response, landfill operators, MSW
transporters, and one Virginia county sued to enjoin the application of
the laws in Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore.233
At the time, Virginia was home to seven regional landfills and sixty-
Virginia landfills could receive; 2) a provision to develop regulations on water
transport of MSW; 3) a ban against the transport of waste on the Rappahannock,
James, and York Rivers; 4) a prohibition on transportation of waste on trucks with
four or more axles without special certification; and 5) a provision to develop
regulations on the transport of MSW by tractor truck semitrailer combinations with
four or more axles. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 323-24 (4th
Cir. 2001).
230. With a deadline to close Fresh Kills landfill by the end of 2001, New York City
formulated a plan to ship its MSW out-of-state. See Bruce Lambert, Mayor Tells Non-
New Yorkers That City's Trash Is Price for What They Reap, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,
1999, at B3. In response to opposition to this plan from states such as Virginia, Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani commented:
New York City has a specialized problem .... It comes from the fact that
we're so crowded and our land mass is very small, and that brings great
benefits to the rest of the country, like Virginia. People in Virginia like to
utilize New York because we're a cultural center, because we're a business
center .... We don't have the room here to handle the garbage that's
produced not just by New Yorkers... but by the three million more people
that come here that utilize the place every day. So this is a reciprocal
relationship.
Id. Mayor Giuliani's comments and New York City's MSW exporting plan drew
angry reactions from other states. New Jersey's Governor Christine Todd Whitman
issued a statement entitled "Whitman to New York's Garbage Plan: Drop Dead." Id.
Virginia's Governor James S. Gilmore wrote Mayor Giuliani a letter stating that he
was "offended by [Mayor Giuliani's] suggestion that New York's substantial cultural
achievements... obligate[d] Virginia and other states to accept [New York City's]
garbage." Gilmore, 252 F.3d at 337. New Jersey, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and West Virginia later signed a letter of protest against the New York City waste
plan. Andy Newman, 5 States Team Up to Fight Giuliani's Trash Proposal, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 1999, at B3.
231. Gilmore, 252 F.3d at 325-26. Fresh Kills covers 2200 acres and held the title of
the world's largest dump before its closure in March 2001. See Denny Lee, At Fresh
Kills Landfill, Garbage Out, Grand Plans In, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2001, § 14, at 6.
With its closure, New York City lost its last operating landfill and had to come up
with a new way to dispose of the nearly 11,000 tons of garbage produced daily by city
residents. See Michael Cooper, A Plan to Ship Garbage, but No Destination, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 1, 2002, at Al. Today, Fresh Kills is on its way to becoming a park and
recreation area. See Barbara Stewart, Landfill to Park? Give It Time; The
Transformation of Fresh Kills Will Take Decades, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 2002, at Bi.
232. Gilmore, 252 F.3d at 323 n.1, 325-26. The provision allowed Virginia's Waste
Management Board to approve individual exceptions after weighing considerations of
"human health, environmental, transportation infrastructure, and transportation
safety impacts and needs." Id. at 323 n.1 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 10.1-1408.3
(Michie Supp. 2000)).
233. Id. at 324. In a published opinion on February 2, 2000, the district court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and invalidated the five Virginia
provisions because they violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 324, 328.
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three small local landfills.234 The seven regional landfills received 97%
of the out-of-state waste that entered Virginia.235 The other 3% of
out-of-state MSW went to two of the local landfills.2136 The remainder
of the local landfills accepted only MSW generated in Virginia.237 The
regional landfills were sited under "host agreements" between private
waste management companies and local communities.238 In exchange
for services such as tipping fees23 9 and free waste disposal, the
communities agreed to host landfills, which were constructed and
operated by the private waste management companies. 240  Because
regional landfills were expensive to construct and operate,241
companies needed to take in large volumes of waste to earn the
income needed to remain in business. 242
To examine the challenged Virginia law, the Fourth Circuit further
delineated the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause test.243
After finding that the landfill cap was not "facially discriminatory"
against out-of-state MSW, the court then outlined two inquiries to
determine whether the law was still invalid under the first step of the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis.24  The first inquiry asked
whether the law discriminated against interstate commerce in
practical effect.245 The second inquiry asked whether the state could
prove that the law was "demonstrably justified by a valid factor
unrelated to economic protectionism, and that no nondiscriminatory
alternatives exist[ed] that [were] adequate to preserve the local
interests at stake. '246  If the law survived these inquiries and
"regulate[d] evenhandedly and only indirectly affect[ed] interstate
commerce," then the second step of the dormant Commerce Clause
234. Id. at 334. The regional landfills had "substantially greater disposal capacity"
than the local landfills and were privately owned. Id. at 325. In addition, the regional
landfills were built during the 1990s and complied with state and federal regulations.
Id.
235. Id. at 334.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 325.
238. Id.
239. For a description of tipping fees, see supra note 85.
240. Gilmore, 252 F.3d at 325.
241. Id. (noting that they "required tens of millions of dollars in private
investment" and "face[d] high operation and maintenance costs in addition to ...
sizeable host fees").
242. Id.
243. See id. at 333-34. This analysis is similar to the inquiry made by the Seventh
Circuit in Bayh. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
244. Gilmore, 252 F.3d at 334, 341. The first step of the Supreme Court's dormant
Commerce Clause analysis applied a virtually per se rule of invalidity to laws that
discriminated against articles of commerce based on their origin. See supra text
accompanying notes 112-14.
245. Gilmore, 252 F.3d at 334.
246. Id. at 341.
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analysis, the Pike balancing test, applied.247 Under this test, "unless
the burdens on commerce [were] clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits," the law would be valid.248
The Fourth Circuit first turned its attention to whether the cap
discriminated against interstate waste in practical effect.249 Six of the
seven regional landfills disposed of more than the capped amount of
2000 tons of MSW per day, while all of the sixty-three local landfills
received below the capped amount.2 ° The Fourth Circuit did not
resolve the question of whether the landfill cap discriminated in its
practical effect against out-of-state MSW, finding that the evidence
presented an issue of material fact.25'
The Fourth Circuit then moved on to the second inquiry-whether
the cap provision was the "least discriminatory means" to address
Virginia's concerns about the health and safety risks particular to out-
of-state MSW. 25 2 Here, the court found that Virginia did not use the
least discriminatory means available because the state could have
targeted only those states that had weaker health and safety standards
for MSW.253 Thus, the court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment
on this issue under this inquiry and affirmed the district court's
holding that the landfill cap violated the dormant Commerce
Clause.254
As Philadelphia, Fort Gratiot, Oregon Waste Systems, Carbone,
Bayh, and Gilmore demonstrate, states have not given up on the issue
of controlling interstate waste flow. 255 In fact, despite their many
defeats, states have been able to obtain control over interstate waste
imports under the market participant exception. 56
247. Id. at 333 (citing Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir.
1996)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 334.
250. Id. One of the local landfills received 1540 tons of MSW per day and applied
for an increase in tonnage allotment for the rare times when it would be in danger of
exceeding 2000 tons of MSW per day due to its waste-to-energy plant being off-line
for repairs. Id.
251. Id. at 335. The Fourth Circuit found that the "practical effect" and "no
nondiscriminatory alternatives" inquiries were questions of fact. Id. at 334. The
Fourth Circuit found that it could not grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs
because of the issue of material fact. Id. at 335.
252. Id. at 342.
253. Id. at 343 ("[R]ather than discriminating against MSW from every state other
than Virginia, Virginia's cap should only target the MSW from states that have lesser
health and safety standards regarding MSW than Virginia.").
254. Id. at 324, 349.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 106-254 (discussing the holdings of
interstate waste flow cases).
256. See infra Part I.B.7.
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7. The Market Participant Exception
All four of the Supreme Court's interstate MSW disposal cases257
involved the regulation of private players. In Philadelphia, New
Jersey landfill owners and the cities that were their customers brought
suit because of New Jersey's import ban.258 Similarly, in Fort Gratiot,
a landfill owner in St. Clair County filed suit in protest over
Michigan's county-by-county import ban. 9 In Oregon Waste Systems,
a landfill owner and a MSW hauler challenged the surcharge on out-
of-state MSW.26° The suit in Carbone was brought by a private waste
management company in Clarkstown. 61 If the parties in these cases
had been public players, the outcomes might have been drastically
different due to the market participant exception.262
Under the market participant exception, "a state or local
government... may pursue its own economic interests free from the
constraints imposed by the Commerce Clause within the market in
which it is a participant. '263 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the market participant exception in the context of interstate MSW and
specifically left the issue undecided in Philadelphia26  and Fort
Gratiot.265  In his dissent in Oregon Waste Systems, Chief Justice
257. See supra Part I.B.1.-4.
258. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 619 (1978); see also supra
Part I.B.1. The cities sued as parties in Philadelphia as customers of private waste
development companies, not as public entities that owned their own waste facilities.
Thus, they did not fall under the market participant exception.
259. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504
U.S. 353,357 (1992); see also supra Part I.B.2.
260. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 97 (1994). Oregon
imposed a surcharge on out-of-state MSW that was higher than the surcharge on in-
state MSW. Id. at 96. Its attempt to justify the difference in the surcharge as a
compensatory tax failed. Id. at 104; see also supra Part I.B.3.
261. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1994). The town of
Clarkstown had passed a flow control ordinance that required that all nonhazardous
waste be brought to a designated waste transfer station. Id. at 387. Under this
ordinance, Carbone would have had to pay Clarkstown's above-market tipping fee
even though it had already sorted its own waste. Id. at 388. See supra Part I.B.4. for a
discussion of Carbone.
262. See Verchick, supra note 24, at 1280.
263. Red River Serv. Corp. v. Minot, 146 F.3d 583, 586 (8th Cir. 1998). The market
participant doctrine was first established in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794 (1976). See Donna Vetrano, Note, Red River Service Corporation v. City of
Minot, North Dakota: Local Government Controls the Importation of Waste Without
Violation of the Commerce Clause, 12 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 265, 266 (1998). The Hughes
case involved Maryland's policy of buying scrapped cars from in-state processors at a
higher price than from out-of-state processors. Id. The out-of-state processors sued
and lost. Id. The Supreme Court held that Maryland did not violate the Commerce
Clause because it acted as a member of the market and could favor its own citizen
over others when it took this role. Id.
264. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1978) (leaving open
the issue of whether states could restrict access of state owned resources to state
residents).
265. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504
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Rehnquist made use of the market participant exception to argue that
if Oregon owned its own landfills, it could charge the surcharge as a
permissible user fee, contrary to the suggestions of the majority
266 I iopinion. In his dissent in Carbone, Justice Souter concluded that
the Clarkstown waste transfer station was "essentially an agent of the
municipal government. 2 67  In his view, the Clarkstown ordinance
should have been evaluated under the Pike balancing test because the
ordinance was less likely to be protectionist where it favored an agent
of the government.268
Although the Supreme Court has not legitimized the market
participant doctrine for interstate MSW, lower courts have applied the
doctrine.269  The Eighth Circuit, for example, used the doctrine to
uphold a city's decision to restrict use of its landfill to waste generated
by its own citizens in Red River Service Corp. v. Minot.2 ° The Second
Circuit applied the doctrine to approve of exclusive waste collection
and disposal contracts in SSC Corp. v. Smithtown.271 The First Circuit,
U.S. 353, 358-59 (1992) ("Nor does the case raise any question concerning policies
that municipalities or other governmental agencies may pursue in the management of
publicly owned facilities.").
266. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 114-15 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
267. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 416 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
268. Id. at 422-23 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a court to apply the Pike test, the law
must govern evenhandedly for a legitimate public purpose, and must have only
incidental effects on interstate commerce that are not excessively burdensome on
commerce when compared to local benefits. See supra notes 115-16.
269. See Red River Serv. Corp. v. Minot, 146 F.3d 583, 586-87 (8th Cir. 1998); SSC
Corp. v. Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 514-17 (2d Cir. 1995); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island,
669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987). But see Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Houlton, 175
F.3d 178, 181, 187-88 (1st Cir. 1999) (expressing reluctance to apply the market
participant doctrine for an exclusive waste management contract).
270. Red River, 146 F.3d at 590. The city of Minot, North Dakota, owned and
operated its own landfill. Id. at 585. Worried about shrinking landfill space, Minot
decided that it would only accept MSW generated by its own citizens and some
grandfathered-in non-citizen haulers. See id. at 585-86. Red River was an Oklahoma
hauler that dumped MSW from the Minot Air Force base in the landfill. Id. at 584.
As it had a five year contract to haul the Air Force base's MSW, Red River protested
against Minot's policy. Id. at 586.
271. 66 F.3d at 514-17. Smithtown and Huntington, both towns in New York,
agreed to share the use of Smithtown's landfill and Huntington's incinerator. Id. at
506-07. At the time of the agreement, the incinerator was under construction. Id. at
506. Although the incinerator was built and owned by Ogden Martin Systems
("Ogden"), Smithtown and Huntington helped finance its construction with proceeds
from tax-free bonds issued by a public authority and secured by their promise to pay
Ogden for the construction and operation costs even if no waste was processed by the
incinerator. Id. at 507. To ensure that waste was processed, Smithtown enacted a flow
control ordinance and entered into a contract with garbage haulers to haul waste
exclusively to the incinerator. Id. at 505. The Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's invalidation of the flow control ordinance under Carbone, but upheld the
exclusive garbage hauling contract as "municipal participation in both the waste
collection and disposal markets." Id. at 506.
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on the other hand, declined to apply the market participant doctrine
to laws that required residents either to use the city's exclusive private
Hauler, or self-haul to a specified f.1l., 272 Instead, the F rt Circuit
used the traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis to find that
the laws were not protectionist because they allowed "all comers" to
bid on an equal basis for the exclusive contract. The court also found
that the laws passed the Pike balancing test.27 3  Thus, the market
participant exception potentially allows states to escape the bounds of
the dormant Commerce Clause. 74 It still, however, awaits a formal
stamp of approval by the Supreme Court for use in the context of
interstate MSW disposal.275
8. Other Permissible Methods of Controlling Interstate Waste Flow
In addition to the market participant exception, a few other
alternatives may withstand the dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
In Chemical Waste, the Supreme Court made three suggestions: first,
a per ton surcharge on all waste disposed of within a state; second, an
evenhanded cap on the amount a landfill could accept; and third, a per
mile tax on all vehicles that hauled waste in the state. 6 The first
method, however, may be politically undesirable because it will raise
disposal fees for residents. 77 States that seek to use the second and
third methods must be careful to avoid making them discriminatory in
practical effect so that they will not be invalidated in the same way as
the potentially evenhanded laws in Bayh and Gilmore.278
C. The LLRW Crisis
The LLRW crisis parallels the MSW crisis in some ways,279 but
diverges in others.280  Radioactive waste did not accumulate
272. Houlton Citizens' Coalition, 175 F.3d at 181, 188.
273. Id. at 188-89. The laws were not discriminatory because they gave "all
comers ... equal access to the local market." Id. at 188. Thus, the Pike balancing test
is applied to determine if the local benefits outweigh the costs on interstate
commerce. Id. at 189. Because of the "strong local interest in efficient and effective
waste management and the virtually invisible burden ... on interstate commerce," the
law passed the balancing test. Id.
274. This is a realistic solution for states because many landfills are state-owned.
See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 114 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that nearly 80% of landfills are state or locally
owned).
275. Verchick, supra note 24, at 1281.
276. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344-45 (1992).
277. See infra note 353 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 207-54 and accompanying text (discussing Bayh and Gilmore).
For example, if the backhauling ban affected the transport of waste in Indiana, it
would not have had as clear a discriminatory effect on only out-of-state MSW. See
Gov't Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1279 (7th Cir.
1992).
279. See infra notes 281-313 and accompanying text (describing the growth of
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substantially until after World War II, when scientists turned from the
use of nuclear technology for the atomic bomb and other military
applications 28 1 to new peacetime, civilian uses such as nuclear power,
industrial research, and medical applications.2 2 These new usages
resulted in the production of radioactive waste in amounts that
required safe disposal methods.283  To address the growth of
commercial nuclear technology and waste, Congress passed the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.2 4 This Act was later subsumed by the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,285 which created the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), an independent watchdog
organization whose authority includes the regulation of commercial
radioactive waste.28 6
The NRC regulates three basic types of commercial radioactive
waste, including high-level radioactive waste ("HLRW"), LLRW, and
mill tailings.287 HLRW consists of spent nuclear fuel.288 Under the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,289 the Department of Energy
("DOE") was directed to study Yucca Mountain, Nevada as a possible
site for national HLRW disposal.29° Concerns over safety continue to
delay the Yucca Mountain project, which is currently slated to be
open for business in 2010.291 Mill tailings, on the other hand, are a by-
LLRW, the problems of closing disposal sites and the desire of states to have control
over interstate flow of LLRW).
280. See infra notes 302-28 and accompanying text (detailing the severity of the
LLRW disposal site crisis and Congress's passage of the LLRWPA and LLRWPAA).
281. Chapman, supra note 57, at 201.
282. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Radioactive Waste: Production,
Storage, Disposal 20-24 (May 2002) [hereinafter U.S. NRC, Radioactive Waste].
283. Chapman, supra note 57, at 202-03; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, A
Short History of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1999 (June 23, 2003), at
http://www.nrc.gov/who-we-are/short-history.html. Safe disposal methods were
needed because of the potential negative health effects from exposure to
radioactivity. See infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text (describing the health
risks from LLRW exposure and disposal methods).
284. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Chapman, supra note 57, at 201-02. The Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 announced the policy of the U.S. to develop civilian uses of
nuclear energy "subject to absolute defense and security considerations." Id. at 202.
In addition, it delegated the responsibility for the disposal of low-level radioactive
waste to the states, suggesting regional solutions, and created the Atomic Energy
Commission. Id.
285. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
286. Chapman, supra note 57, at 202.
287. U.S. NRC, Radioactive Waste, supra note 282, at 2-3.
288. Id. at 7.
289. Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
290. U.S. NRC, Radioactive Waste, supra note 282, at 15.
291. Keay Davidson, Last-Minute Glitches in Yucca Nuclear-Waste Burial Plan;
New Findings Could Scuttle Idea for Underground Site, S.F. Chron., Nov. 17, 2003, at
A4 (describing recent chemists' findings that buried fuel rods could experience
chemical changes underground).
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product of processing uranium and thorium ores.292 They are usually
disposed of in piles next to the milling site,293 where NRC regulations
require that they be covered to prevent the re-lease of rado after the
milling operations have finished.294  LLRW encompasses all other
radioactive wastes besides HLRW and mill tailings.295
LLRW by far dominates the radioactive waste scene, making up
85% of the volume of radioactive waste generated in the United
States.296 LLRW includes such diverse items as smoke alarms, exit
signs, medical test tubes, laboratory animal carcasses, contaminated
protective gear, and nuclear reactor parts.297 LLRW varies in its level
of radioactivity. 298  While reactor by-products are very hazardous,
wastes from sources such as medical research are minimally hazardous
and do not require the use of protective shielding for handling.299
Proper disposal of LLRW requires shielding and isolation from
people for hundreds of years while the radioactive material decays to
safe levels.31 Existing disposal sites employ the shallow land burial
technique to dispose of LLRW.3 1
The LLRW crisis emerged in the late 1970s.12 Although six
commercial LLRW disposal sites opened in the United States
between 1962 and 1971,"13 three of them closed by 1978 due to ground
water pooling and radioactive leachate contamination."° Faced with a
292. U.S. NRC, Radioactive Waste, supra note 282, at 31.
293. Milling sites are the locations of mining operations where ore is milled. See id.
at 31-32.
294. Id. at 32-33.
295. Id. at 3.
296. Branson, supra note 38, at 518. By volume, 14.8% of LLRW comes from
nuclear reactors, 6.7% from industrial users, 2% from government uses (excluding
nuclear weapons), 0.3% from academic users, 0.1% from medical facilities, and 76.1%
from undefined sources. U.S. NRC, Radioactive Waste, supra note 282, at 20-21.
297. U.S. NRC, Radioactive Waste, supra note 282, at 19, 23.
298. Id. at 20.
299. Id. at 24. Health risks from LLRW include an increased risk of cancer and
possible death. Id. The exact connection between exposure to LLRW and such health
effects, however, is unclear as the health impact could take many years to be seen.
Branson, supra note 38, at 520.
300. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149-50 (1992); see also Branson,
supra note 38, at 518 (noting that LLRW requires only "marginal" shielding for
disposal and decays more quickly than HLRW).
301. Branson, supra note 38, at 522. Shallow land burial involves "excavating a
trench or vault, emplacing the waste, minimizing void space within the disposal unit,
and covering the waste with earth to control access to waste." Id. at 522 n.37 (quoting
D.G. Jacobs & R.R. Rose, Shallow Land Burial of Radioactive Wastes, in
Management of Radioactive Materials and Wastes: Issues and Progress 54, 54
(Shyamal K. Majumdar & E. Willard Miller eds., 1985)).
302. See id. at 524-25.
303. Id. at 524. LLRW disposal sites were located in Beatty, Nevada; Maxey Flats,
Kentucky; West Valley, New York; Richland, Washington (sometimes called the
Hanford site); Sheffield, Illinois; and Barnwell, South Carolina. Gerrard, Fear and
Loathing, supra note 47, at 1081.
304. Branson, supra note 38, at 524. Ground water pooling in the shallow burial
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rising tide of LLRW,30 5 the host states of the three remaining disposal
sites were reluctant to become the "nuclear dumping grounds" of the
nation.3 °6 Two of the remaining three sites, located in Richland,
Washington 37 and Beatty, Nevada, shut down temporarily in 1979 in
response to incidents of improper handling and packaging of
LLRW.3°8 This prompted scares that valuable medical research would
be stopped in its tracks due to lack of disposal capacity.39 During the
Richland and Beatty sites' temporary shut-downs in 1979, Barnwell,
South Carolina, became the only open LLRW disposal site and it had
put limits on the types of LLRW that it would accept.310 In fact,
fearing that his state would have to take on the entire nation's
LLRW," South Carolina's governor announced in 1979 that the
Barnwell site would cut in half the amount of waste it received over
the next two years.312 This prompted the governors of Nevada and
Washington to threaten to close their LLRW dumps permanently.313
This drastic situation caught the attention of Congress and spurred the
passage of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980.311
1. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980
("LLRWPA")
The LLRWPA had three basic provisions. First, under federal
policy, states were responsible for the disposal of LLRW generated
within their borders and were to strive for a regional disposal
system.315 Second, states could form regional compacts to establish
and operate LLRW disposal facilities. 316 Third, states that had formed
trenches caused erosion and movement of radioactive material, leading to
contamination of groundwater with radioactive leachate. Id. The LLRW disposal
sites that closed were located in West Valley, New York; Maxey Flats, Kentucky; and
Sheffield, Illinois. Id.
305. Id. at 524-25.
306. Thomas O'Toole, A-Dump Closing Threatens to Halt Cancer Research, Wash.
Post, Oct. 24, 1979, at Al.
307. The Richland site is located on the Hanford reservation, and is referred to as
the Hanford site by the NRC. See infra note 517.
308. Branson, supra note 38, at 526.
309. O'Toole, supra note 306. The Richland and Beatty sites were only
temporarily shut down. Branson, supra note 38, at 526 & n.75 (noting that the Beatty
site closed several times in 1979 in response to LLRW mishandling).
310. O'Toole, supra note 306 (noting that South Carolina's governor banned liquid
LLRW and LLRW that would have otherwise gone to Richland or Beatty).
311. South Carolina had also become the butt of jokes on television shows and in
newspaper columns as a dumping ground for LLRW. See Newberry, supra note 37, at
46 n.14.
312. See Mostaghel, supra note 36, at 385; see also Gerrard, Fear and Loathing,
supra note 47, at 1081.
313. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1081.
314. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-
2021d (2000)); see also Mostaghel, supra note 36, at 386.
315. Id. § 4(a)(1)(A)-(B), 94 Stat. at 3348.
316. Id. § 4(a)(2)(A), 94 Stat. at 3348 ("States may enter to such compacts as may
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congressionally approved compacts317 could restrict the use of their
LLRW disposal facilities to waste generated in the compact region
after January 1, 1986.31' Congress constructed the LLRWP to cater
to states' desires for control over disposal, and followed the
recommendations of the National Governors' Association ("NGA")
by creating the interstate compact system for LLRW disposal.319
Although thirty-seven states entered into compacts by 1985, none of
the compacts had been approved by Congress.3 20 Furthermore, none
of the compacts had constructed or sited any new disposal sites.321
When the three states with disposal sites again threatened either to
shut down or to exclude waste, the NGA stepped in to negotiate a
"transition package" that would keep the disposal sites open to the
nation. 2
2. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985 ("LLRWPAA" or "Amendments")
This "transition package" became the LLRWPAA.323  The
LLRWPAA expanded on the LLRWPA in three important ways.324
First, it extended the time during which other states could dispose of
their waste at the Barnwell, Richland, and Beatty sites from January
1, 1986 until December 31, 1992.325 During that time, the sites could
be necessary to provide for the establishment and operation of regional disposal
facilities for low-level radioactive waste.").
317. For a compact to take effect, Congress had to consent by law. Id. § 4(a)(2)(B),
94 Stat. at 3348 ("A compact entered under subparagraph (A) shall not take effect
until the Congress has by law consented to the compact."). Congress could withdraw
consent by law every five years after the compact took effect. Id. ("Each such
compact shall provide that every 5 years after the compact has taken effect the
Congress may by law withdraw its consent.")
318. Id. ("After January 1, 1986, any such compact may restrict the use of the
regional disposal facilities under the compact to the disposal of low-level radioactive
waste generated within the region."). The power to exclude extended only to
compact states and not to stand-alone states that had not joined a compact. Wash.
State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982).
In Spellman, the Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence to Washington's attempt to exclude all other states from
accessing its Richland facility. See id. at 631.
319. Mostaghel, supra note 36, at 385-86.
320. Branson, supra note 38, at 533 (noting that members of Congress were
reluctant to ratify compacts when their states had not yet gained access to disposal
sites).
321. Id.
322. Mostaghel, supra note 36, at 386.
323. Id.
324. The LLRWPAA also included other provisions, such as those to place a
percentage of LLRW disposal fees in an escrow account that would be paid back to
states that met the LLRWPAA's milestones, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2) (2000); to
delegate responsibility to the NRC to oversee a system of licensing LLRW disposal
sites, 42 U.S.C. § 2021i; and to identify other methods of disposing of LLRW besides
shallow land burial, 42 U.S.C. § 2021h.
325. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
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cap the amount of waste they accepted and charge a graduated fee
that increased every two years until 1992.326 Second, it created
milestones that required compacts and stand-alone states without
disposal sites to develop their own sites or otherwise ensure that they
could take care of their own LLRW by certain deadlines. Lastly,
the Amendments set out penalties that would apply if states did not
meet the milestones.328
The LLRWPA was supposed to give states an incentive to solve
their LLRW disposal problems by granting them the authority to
control interstate LLRW flow through the regional compact system.329
Even with the carrot of this coveted power, states were unable to
mobilize fast enough to site new LLRW disposal facilities.33° The
LLRWPAA added penalties to the incentive structure of the
LLRWPA to put pressure on states to address the LLRW crisis. 3
These measures did not work either, as states have still not been able
to develop any new disposal sites.332 Both the LLRWPA and its
Amendments have failed in their goal to encourage the development
of more LLRW disposal capacity.333
3. An Analogue for the MSW Crisis and the Garbage Wars
Like the MSW crisis, the LLRW crisis is fueled by concerns over a
lack of disposal capacity. 334 The similarity between the two crises has
not gone unnoticed. In a 1995 study of the national MSW market,
Kirsten Engel suggested that Congress adopt an interstate compact
system like that established by the LLRWPA and its Amendments to
99-240, § 5(a)-(b), 99 Stat. 1842, 1846-47 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2021e).
326. Id. § 5(b), 5(d)(1), 99 Stat. at 1847. The fee was $10 per cubic foot in 1986 and
1987, $20 per cubic foot in 1988 and 1989, and $40 per cubic foot in 1990, 1991, and
1992.
327. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e); Branson, supra note 38, at 536; Mostaghel, supra note
36, at 389-94.
328. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d); Branson, supra note 38, at 536-37. Such penalties
included a surcharge paid by states that would only be returned if milestones were
met; increasing fees that could be charged for dumping at the LLRW disposal sites, or
even denial of access; and the "take-title" provisions that made states own the LLRW
generated within their borders and assume the associated liabilities. Id. at 543. The
"take-title" provision was invalidated and severed from the rest of the LLRWPAA by
the Supreme Court in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186-87 (1992).
329. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 66.
330. See infra Part II.B.1.
331. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
332. See infra Part II.B.1.
333. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1050, 1093 ("Few laws have
failed so completely as the federal and state statutes designed to create new facilities
for the disposal of ... radioactive waste."); see also infra Part II.B.1.
334. See Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 73-76; Weinberg, supra note 86, at 57
(noting the concerns of states and localities over landfill shortages).
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deal with the MSW crisis.335 Professor Engel hypothesized that such a
system would solve the problems of equity, lack of capacity, and
inefficiency that stem from the national MSW market.
336
Congress designed the LLRWPA and the LLRWPAA to stave off
the LLRW equivalent of the MSW Garbage Wars. The brewing
LLRW Wars were set off by threats from the three sited states to
exclude other states from access to disposal, or more drastically, to
eliminate disposal capacity by shutting down their facilities.337 Like
MSW importing states, LLRW importing states attempted to use state
laws to exclude out-of-state waste.338  In 1980, the State of
Washington, which hosted the Richland site, passed a voter initiative
to prohibit the transportation and storage of radioactive waste
produced outside the state.339
The Ninth Circuit quickly squelched this law under the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. 40 The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that
under the compact system of the LLRWPA, Washington could
legitimately pass a measure to exclude the waste of states outside its
compact.34 Thus, in contrast to the deadlocked result of the MSW
Garbage Wars, where states continue to enact discriminatory garbage
laws and courts continue to strike such laws down,342 the war to
control interstate LLRW flow through state law has ended.343 The
resolution to the LLRW Wars, however, has not brought peace.
Rather, states have clashed over the difficulties of siting new LLRW
disposal facilities under the compact system.34
D. The Siting Crisis
Underlying the MSW and LLRW crises and the Garbage Wars is
the problem of siting."5 Siting is the process of choosing a location for
335. See Engel, supra note 43, at 1551-60. Even before Professor Engel's study,
Michael Harpring suggested in a 1991 student comment that an interstate compact
system for MSW would help states solve the garbage crisis by fostering uniformity,
diffusing emotional tensions, and encouraging regional problem solving. See
Harpring, supra note 43, at 888-91 & n.266.
336. See Engel, supra note 43, at 1552-53. But see Murray & Spence, supra note 77,
at 94-97 (rejecting a system of multi-state compacts to address waste management
problems because of the failure of the LLRWPA and its Amendments).
337. See supra notes 302-14 and accompanying text (describing the LLRW crisis
and the passage of the LLRWPA).
338. See, e.g., Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1982).
339. Id. at 629.
340. Id. at 630-31.
341. Id. at 630.
342. See supra Part I.B. (describing the interstate MSW cases).
343. See Spellman, 684 F.2d at 630 (noting that Congress had enacted the Atomic
Energy Act and the LLRWPA to regulate nuclear activities).
344. See supra Part II.B. (describing the results of the LLRWPA and LLRWPAA).
345. See U.S. EPA, 2 Decision Maker's Guide, supra note 85, at 2-1 ("Facility
siting... [has] become the most contentious and difficult aspect[] of the solid waste
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new disposal facilities and includes planning, site selection and design,
and implementation.346 Difficulties with the siting process and landfill
closures3 47 have led states to perceive a landfill shortage.3 48 These
perceptions have prompted states to enact laws that would limit the
use of their landfills to local residents.349 Many of these laws, in turn,
have been struck down under the dormant Commerce Clause.350
Thus, difficulties in siting"' have fueled importing states' pursuit of
legislative solutions that permit them to preserve landfill space for
their own disposal needs,352 without requiring them to take measures
that would increase in-state disposal costs, such as raising tipping fees
across the board.353
1. The Knockdown Drag-Out Fight of the Siting Process
Traditionally, landfills were sited under a top-down model, where
government officials used technical criteria to select a suitable site
management process."); see infra notes 495-500 and accompanying text (describing
the siting crisis for LLRW disposal sites).
346. See U.S. EPA, Decision Maker's Guide, supra note 85, at 2-4. In the planning
stage, the facility developer must gather information to help decide what kind of
facility to build. Id. at 2-5, fig. 2-1. Then, the developer must find a location that
fulfills the criteria for obtaining a permit, as well as deciding on a design for the
facility. Id. Lastly, in the implementation stage, the developer must monitor the
landfill and ensure that it is properly closed when it is full. Id.
347. See Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 74-75.
348. See U.S. EPA, MSW 2000, supra note 33, at 14 (noting that "[a]t the national
level, capacity does not appear to be a problem, although regional dislocations
sometimes occur"); Weinberg, supra note 86, at 58. The siting problem is political,
rather than physical. Alexander, supra note 1, at 9-10. Compared to other
industrialized countries, the United States has by far the largest amount of available
land to create new disposal capacity relative to population size and discards per
person. Id. In the LLRW context, this shortage was extremely clear. See supra notes
307-13 and accompanying text (describing how all three of the existing LLRW dumps
threatened to close).
349. See Weinberg, supra note 86, at 58-59.
350. See supra Part I.B. (summarizing the interstate waste cases).
351. Engel, supra note 43, at 1514-15 (finding that interstate waste disposal allowed
states to avoid the siting problem).
352. See Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 73-76; Rebekah Hall, Industry Sues
State over Canada Cargo, Waste Age, Oct. 2003, at 4 (noting that the rationale for a
Michigan county's 2003 law restricting trash imports was to preserve landfill space for
residents).
353. Lana Pollack, Editorial, Cheap Prices Make State a Dumping Ground; Restrict
Homegrown and Imported Waste, Detroit News, Sept. 28, 2003, at A19; cf. Kevin
Penton, Neighboring States Are Dumping on the Valley; Northhampton Landfills
Taking in More Imported Garbage, and That May Rise, Morning Call (Allentown,
Pa.), Sept. 28, 2003, at Al (noting that Pennsylvania's state fee rose $4 per ton in
2002). Indeed, when Alabama raised its tipping fees for out-of-state hazardous waste,
the amount of waste received fell from 791,000 tons to 290,000 tons within two years.
Chemical Waste Mgmt, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 n.4 (1992). Also, LLRW
facilities have dramatically raised their prices, from $40 per cubic foot in the 1980s
and 1990s to hundreds of dollars per cubic foot today, causing the amount of disposed
LLRW to plummet. See supra note 326.
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before announcing their decision to the public.354 This model resulted
in strong public opposition, which led to the shelving of many siting
proposals.355 The use of the top-down model, also called the "decide-
announce-defend" model, has since become discouraged. 6  In its
place, the EPA has encouraged officials to embrace the public
participation model.357
The process of siting can take many years.358 It begins with
estimations of how much new disposal capacity is needed.35 9 The next
step is to choose potential sites based on land use plans and geological
conditions.3" The sites must conform to federal, state, and local
regulations and must obtain the necessary permits.361  Then, the
facility must be designed and constructed.362 Once in place, the facility
must have a management plan to regulate its operation and closure.363
Site developers are encouraged to include the public in all stages of
this process.36
The siting process does not always go smoothly.3 65 The recent siting
of a 1030 acre landfill by a private developer in Taliaferro Country,
Georgia incited community revolt.366 Three county commissioners
were thrown in jail for failing to obey a judicial order to write a letter
of assurance to the Georgia Environmental Protection Division
stating that the landfill complied with zoning regulations.367 In other
instances, however, siting can end happily. Tullytown, Pennsylvania,
for example, welcomed the siting of a new landfill, as it infused the old
354. Barry G. Rabe et al., NIMBY and Maybe: Conflict and Cooperation in the
Siting of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities in the United States and
Canada, 24 Envtl. L. 67, 70 (1994).
355. Id. at 81.
356. U.S. EPA, 2 Decision Maker's Guide, supra note 85, at 2-4.
357. Id. Such a model includes public discussion and involvement, as well as
disclosure of issues that arise in the siting process. Id. at 2-7, tbl. 2-1.
358. The EPA estimates that it takes three to ten years to site, design and construct
an MSW landfill. Id. at 9-11.
359. Id. at 9-12.
360. Id. at 9-14 to 9-18. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")
prohibits siting near airports, flood plains, wetlands, faults, seismic zones, and
unstable areas. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000); U.S. EPA, 2 Decision Maker's Guide,
supra note 85, at 9-16.
361. Id. at 9-18 to 9-19. States and localities may require developers to submit a
waste management plan and obtain additional permits. Id. at 9-19.
362. Id. at 9-26.
363. Id. at 9-30.
364. Id. at 2-5, 9-26, 9-28.
365. For strategies that communities can use to stop facilities, see Michael B.
Gerrard, Stopping and Building New Facilities, in The Law of Environmental Justice:
Theories and Procedures to Address Disproportionate Risks 465 (Michael B. Gerrard
ed., 1999).
366. Robert Pavey, Landfill Lands Leaders in Jail, Augusta Chron., Oct. 15, 2003,
at Al.
367. Id.
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mining town's budget with $48 million dollars over fifteen years, while
providing a multitude of free municipal services.368
2. Economics and Equity
Siting is inherently inequitable.3 69  No matter where a landfill is
sited, it greatly burdens one part of a population over another.3 70 It
would be impractical, however, to distribute landfills equally because
larger regional facilities are safer, more efficient, and, on the whole,
burdensome to fewer people.371
Certain types of inequities in siting, such as environmental racism,
have emerged as unacceptable and are carefully scrutinized.3 In the
late 1980s, a series of studies revealed that minorities and poor
communities were disproportionately burdened by environmental
risks.373 This data prompted the rise of the environmental justice
movement.374 In 1994, President William J. Clinton issued Executive
Order 12,898, requiring federal agencies to consider the
environmental impact of their actions on minority and poor
populations and create policies to achieve environmental justice
goals.375  Many states have also adopted programs to address
environmental justice issues.376
368. Rick Hampson, Trash Provides 'Horn 0' Plenty' for Towns, USA Today,
Sept. 29, 2003, at A15.
369. See Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1122-25 (finding an
"irreconcilable" conflict in the principles that should be followed for equitable siting).
370. Colglazier & English, supra note 47, at 645-47.
371. Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21
Fordham Urb. L.J. 787, 791 (1994).
372. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1125-31.
373. Id. at 1125 (describing the environmental justice movement). In the case of
interstate waste flow, however, there is no evidence to suggest that minorities bear a
greater burden. In fact, the statistics seem to suggest the opposite. Engel, supra note
43, at 1494-95 ("[I]n contrast to what might be expected from the conventional
wisdom on environmental inequities, this analysis does not provide any evidence that
racial minorities endure a greater solid waste burden, at least when statistics are
aggregated at the state level."). But see Davies, supra note 171, at 266-67 (noting that
in Virginia and Ohio, imported waste goes to counties with higher numbers of
minorities than the rest of the state).
374. Verchick, supra note 24, at 1289-94.
Environmental justice... describes an area of activism and study that is
concerned with the distribution of environmental benefits and harms on the
basis of people's race, sex, age, income, or other characteristics. Spawned by
grassroots activists across the country, the environmental justice movement
originally began as a protest against the siting of polluting industries and
waste facilities in poor communities or communities of color.
Id. at 1289.
375. Bradford C. Mank, Executive Order 12,898, in The Law of Environmental
Justice: Theories and Procedures to Address Disproportionate Risks 103 (Michael B.
Gerrard ed., 1999). The order can be found at Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg.
7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
376. See Chuck D. Barlow, State Environmental Justice Programs and Related
Authorities, in The Law of Environmental Justice: Theories and Procedures to
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Ideally, the siting process allows both facility developers and
communities to maximize net benefits.377 The facility developer wants
to find an area with low land costs near the source of generated wastc,
and with geological features that minimize future environmental
liability.37 The community, in turn, wants assurances as to safety and
health, and also wants compensation for taking on the associated risks
of hosting a landfill.379 These incentives have led to the practice of
compensated siting.38
A compensated siting scheme allows developers to compensate
communities for bearing the cost of hosting a waste disposal facility.38'
Compensated siting has been lauded as a way to make developers
internalize the costs of a project, giving them the incentive to build
efficient facilities.382  In addition, communities are given the
opportunity to voluntarily participate in the siting process, making it
more likely that a project will be approved.383
Critics have disapproved of this practice, however, viewing the
compensation as a bribe rather than as a fully informed, voluntary
decision, and further, finding it immoral to commodify health. 84
Moreover, compensated siting may not always be completely
equitable-for example, a disposal site may affect people outside the
host community who will not be compensated.385 Compensated siting
can also fail if volunteer communities cannot be found.386 Despite the
negative aspects of compensated siting, it is still one of the most
promising ways to develop new disposal capacity.387
Address Disproportionate Risks 140 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999) (summarizing
state environmental justice programs); Sheila Foster, Impact Assessment, in The Law
of Environmental Justice: Theories and Procedures to Address Disproportionate
Risks 256, 285 nn.148-78 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999) (detailing state
environmental justice laws).
377. Tom Tietenberg, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 499-500
(5th ed. 2000). The facility owner seeks net benefits that would allow him to process
wastes cheaply. Id. The community wants benefits from compensation or promises of
safety to outweigh its costs. Id.
378. Id. Such liabilities might include the cost of cleanup if the site becomes
contaminated. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (mentioning RCRA's
corrective action measure).
379. Tietenberg, supra note 377, at 500.
380. Been, supra note 371, at 788-91.
381. Id. (describing compensated siting proposals and justifications for using them).
382. Id. at 791.
383. Id.
384. Engel, supra note 43, at 1545.
385. See Been, supra note 371, at 826 (pondering the question of whether a ski
resort twenty miles away from the site should be able to have a voice in the process).
386. Id. at 800-08 (describing how state compact commissions were ultimately
unsuccessful with compensated siting in the context of LLRW).
387. Id. at 823-24.
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3. Psychology and NIMBY
The human psyche is an important part of the siting process, as
emotions run high and logic does not always prevail.388 An example of
the importance of human psychology in siting is the NIMBY389
syndrome, where public opposition has consistently blocked the siting
of undesirable, but necessary, facilities such as landfills.390 According
to Michael B. Gerrard, the NIMBY phenomenon comes from a
community's feelings of "dread and intrusion"-the vague and
undefined health threats from waste disposal sites (dread), combined
with the feelings of mistrust and invasion from the outside
(intrusion) 391
The NIMBY syndrome, however, can be addressed through a more
human approach to the siting process.3" According to Gerrard, the
siting process would be more productive if it incorporated measures to
account for the human instinct of territoriality.3 93 Territoriality is the
primal instinct to defend one's turf from outside invasion.394  It
explains the fury of importing states towards exporting states and the
powerful opposition of communities against unwelcome landfill
developers.391 It also explains the failure of the top-down, "decide-
announce-defend," model of siting.396
To account for territoriality, developers can adopt three different
approaches. First, a developer can seek volunteers to host disposal
facilities, as in compensated siting.397  Second, developers can
emphasize societal responsibility398  for waste production by
committing to source reduction and other alternative methods of
dealing with the waste disposal crisis. Third, developers can depict
waste disposal in holistic terms to deflect the perception of inequity.399
For example, although a community may be burdened by hosting a
388. Michael B. Gerrard, Territoriality, Risk Perception, and Counterproductive
Legal Structures: The Case of Waste Facility Siting, 27 Envtl. L. 1017 (1997)
(emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Gerrard, Territoriality].
389. See supra text accompanying note 91 (describing NIMBY and other acronyms
referring to community protest against siting projects like waste disposal facilities).
390. Rabe et al., supra note 354, at 69.
391. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1138-46.
392. Gerrard, Territoriality, supra note 388.
393. Id. at 1018.
394. Id. at 1018-20.
395. See id.
396. See id. at 1020-21; supra note 356 and accompanying text.
397. See Gerrard, Territoriality, supra note 388, at 1023 ("[T]his would mean
seeking disposal sites in communities that have volunteered for them.... ").
398. See id. at 1022 (explaining how fairness and equitable distribution can
counteract territoriality).
399. See id. at 1026 (describing how the separate treatment of different types of
waste leads to the perception of inequity); id. at 1030 (proposing a comprehensive
approach that addresses the waste streams together as a way to counteract
perceptions of inequity).
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MSW facility, it may be exporting its hazardous waste or LLRW to
another community.4"' Thus, when the waste streams are considered
together, the burdens on the communities are more equitable.
Additionally, gaining a community's trust through education about
the risks and benefits can help overcome NIMBY and territoriality.4 2
The Garbage Wars are yet another example of NIMBY, but on a
state scale.403 Outraged at being dumping grounds for the nation,
states continually attempt to blockade their borders from outside
garbage.4° This self-same reaction was present in the LLRW crisis.4 5
The LLRWPA and LLRWPAA were meant to address the primal
instinct that made Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina refuse to
be the LLRW dumping grounds for the nation.4 6 To gauge the
success of the LLRW legislation and its helpfulness for the MSW
context, Part II first examines the state psyche concerning MSW
imports, and then moves on to scrutinize the results of the LLRW
compact system.
II. DISMANTLING THE EMOTION, POLITICS, AND RHETORIC OF THE
GARBAGE WARS
After the Supreme Court's decision in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey,4°7 states have tried to attain the ability to ban or limit MSW
imports. 8 Although states gained this power over interstate LLRW,
they still failed to address the LLRW disposal crisis.409 Undaunted,
states have continued to pursue their goal of controlling interstate
MSW flow through both state law410 and congressional solutions. In
fact, bills granting states the power over interstate waste flow have
been introduced in every session of Congress since the late 1980s, but
none have become law.411 Part II.A. outlines states' concerns and
400. See id.
401. Id.
402. See Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1149-51 (describing how
communities that are familiar with waste disposal facilities are more willing to be
hosts for such facilities).
403. See supra Part I.B. (detailing states' attempts to ban or limit out-of-state
garbage in their landfills).
404. See supra Part I.B.
405. See supra notes 302-14 and accompanying text (describing the LLRW crisis).
406. See supra notes 302-14 and accompanying text.
407. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
408. See Weinberg, supra note 86, at 60.
409. See infra text accompanying notes 495-500.
410. See supra note 30 (describing Michigan's 2003 law placing limitations on
interstate waste flow).
411. McCarthy & Hardenbergh, supra note 93, at CRS-1. In 1994, the 103rd
Congress passed interstate waste bills in both the House and Senate, but failed to
enact them into law because of disagreements over language. See S. 2345, 103d Cong.
(1994); H.R. 4779, 103d Cong. (1994); McCarthy & Hardenbergh, supra note 93, at
CRS-1 n.1. In 1995, the Senate passed the Interstate Transportation of Municipal
Solid Waste Act, but this bill was not enacted into law either. S. 534, 104th Cong.
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their expected benefits from gaining this control, as well as some
proposed solutions from Congress. Part II.B. contrasts these concerns
and expectations with the failures of the LLRWPA and the
LLRWPAA, which granted states the ability to control the flow of
interstate LLRW.
A. The Rose-Colored Glasses of the Garbage Soldiers: State
Rationales for Controlling Waste Flow and Congressional Solutions
By gaining control over interstate waste flow, states hope to address
concerns such as health, environmental protection, and fairness. Part
II.A. catalogues the state concerns expressed in the interstate waste
cases. Then, it describes the provisions of two recent bills before
Congress, which were drafted to address states' concerns about
interstate MSW.
1. State Concerns
The four main Supreme Court MSW dormant Commerce Clause
decisions demonstrate the gamut of concerns that states have about
out-of-state garbage.412 In Philadelphia, New Jersey's legislature
passed an import ban because waste disposal was a threat to
environmental quality; the state's landfills were nearly full; and
banning out-of-state waste would protect public health, safety, and
welfare.413 The New Jersey Supreme Court found that New Jersey
would run out of landfill space within a few years, and that the state
would have to develop new landfill capacity, most likely from "virgin
wetlands or other undeveloped lands." '414 In Fort Gratiot, Michigan
was concerned about long-term planning to protect health and
safety.415 Because Michigan had developed a state waste management
plan, and had taken measures to conserve landfill capacity, the state
felt it was reasonable to enact the county approval system because
counties could then plan for future waste flows. 4 16  Oregon, in
contrast, was concerned about fairness in Oregon Waste Systems.417
Oregon wanted other states to "pay their 'fair share' of the costs" of
disposal within its borders.41 Clarkstown, New York, had a purely
(1995); McCarthy & Hardenbergh, supra note 93, at CRS-I n.1.
412. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Or. Waste Sys., Inc.
v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). For a discussion of these cases, see supra Part I.B.1.-4.
413. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 625.
414. Id. (citation omitted).
415. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 363-64 (describing Michigan's argument that the
statute was necessary to protect citizens' health).
416. Id. at 364, 366.
417. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 102.
418. Id.
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economic objective in Carbone-to finance its waste transfer
station.419
Inc m1 out,, Circu it' opinion in (.1-liore sheds mligh than ei
Supreme Court decisions on the emotional milieu behind the retinue
of laws directed at out-of-state garbage.42 As the second-largest
importer of MSW, Virginia wished to protect its state reputation.421
As a Virginia General Assembly delegate phrased the issue: "Do we
want to be known as the capital of garbage?... Maybe we need a
new bumper sticker-instead of Virginia is for lovers, what about
Virginia is for garbage? '422  Virginia also cited several secondary
concerns such as worry over its ability to dispose of its own waste in
the future, distrust of out-of-state waste, and potential environmental
impacts from hosting landfills.423
The Bayh case also documents the divisive sentiment behind the
Garbage Wars.424 In 1990, the District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana addressed an earlier version of the laws later considered by
the Seventh Circuit.425 The court found that Indiana was concerned
about the amount and composition of out-of-state waste disposed of
in Indiana landfills. 26 In fact, three different inspections of out-of-
state trash turned up potentially infectious medical waste such as
hypodermic needles and gloves contaminated with human blood.427 A
further justification of Indiana's worries was that two of its former
sanitary landfills were designated as Superfund sites42 and others
419. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994).
420. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 336-40 (4th Cir. 2001).
See supra Part I.B.6. for further discussion of Gilmore.
421. Gilmore, 252 F.3d at 337.
422. Id. at 339 (quotation marks omitted).
423. Id. at 337.
Senator Boiling... list[ed] the following four reasons: (1) continuing to
allow Virginia's limited landfill space to be consumed by MSW generated
outside Virginia may harm the ability of Virginia to properly dispose of its
own waste in years to come; (2) because MSW generated outside Virginia is
handled by a number of vendors before being transported to Virginia,
Virginia's ability to have a satisfactory level of confidence about the nature
of the waste it receives is limited; (3) the large amount of MSW generated
outside Virginia that Virginia is currently receiving 'has the potential of
harming Virginia's legacy and image'; and (4) the potential for negative
environmental impact on Virginia's land by the 'massive landfill operations.'
Id.
424. Gov't Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir.
1992). See supra Part I.B.5. for further discussion of the Bayh case.
425. Gov't Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind.
1990).
426. Id. at 745.
427. Id. at 754-55. A routine inspection of in-state trash, however, also turned up
potentially infectious waste, suggesting that Indiana's distrust of out-of-state waste
was misplaced. See id. at 756.
428. Superfund sites are sites placed on the EPA's National Priority List for
hazardous waste cleanup by state and federal authorities under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), Pub. L.
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were designated as sites that required remedial cleaning under state
law.429 Governor Bayh's State of the State address revealed two other
concerns-the fear of being a "dumping ground for the nation" and
losing "scarce disposal capacity."430
The concerns expressed in Philadelphia, Fort Gratiot, Oregon Waste
Systems, Carbone, Gilmore, and Bayh were not unique to each state.431
All of the states passed their interstate waste laws because of common
fears about shortages (or excesses, as in Carbone) of waste disposal
capacity, health effects from receiving out-of-state waste, and state
pride. 2 Although these laws assuaged these fears at the state level,
they accentuated the disposal capacity fears of exporting states on a
national level.433
2. Congressional Solutions
Judging by the virtual deadlock between the states and the courts
over state-crafted solutions that would allow states to address their
concerns by controlling MSW flow, congressional solutions appear to
be the key to ending the Garbage Wars.4 4 So far, however, this route
has also proved discouraging. 435 Bills giving states the ability to ban or
otherwise limit waste imports have been presented to Congress since
the late 1980s, but none of them have been successful. 436 This has led
some scholars to suggest that states turn to laws that have already
been enacted, such as using the EPA's authority under RCRA to only
approve state waste management plans that prohibit MSW
exportation.437 On the other hand, one commentator questions
Congress's ability to even enact a statute that would allow states to
put up barriers to interstate MSW without violating the Equal
Protection Clause.438
Despite Congress's disappointing reception of interstate MSW laws,
representatives from several states have continued to propose such
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). See Percival et al., supra note 61, at 224-26.
429. Gov't Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 748. MSW sanitary landfills can contain
hazardous waste as they accept this type of waste from "small quantity generator[s]."
Id. at 749 (citation omitted).
430. Id. at 746.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 412-30.
432. See supra text accompanying notes 412-30.
433. See supra Part I.B. (describing how exporting states or their contracted haulers
brought suit to invalidate interstate waste control laws so that they could meet their
own waste disposal needs).
434. Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 91-92; Weinberg, supra note 86, at 64-67.
435. See Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 92; see also supra note 411 (describing
how some interstate waste control bills were passed by the House and/or Senate, but
were ultimately not enacted into law).
436. See Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 92.
437. Id. at 97-100.
438. Weinberg, supra note 86, at 68-72.
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bills.439 This section examines two of the bills that are currently under
consideration, H.R. 418 and H.R. 1730.
a. Proposed Laws Before the 108th Congress
H.R. 418 and H.R. 1730 were presented to Congress on January 28,
2003 and April 10, 2003, respectively. 440 Both bills give states control
over interstate waste, but through contrasting approaches.
b. H.R. 418: Solid Waste Compact Act
Representative Paul Kanjorski, a Democrat from Pennsylvania,
introduced H.R. 418 to the House on January 28, 2003.4 1 The bill
would amend Subtitle D of the Solid Waste Disposal Act
("SWDA") 442 by adding two new provisions." 3  Under the first
provision, a "State whose State [waste management] plan has been
approved ... may prohibit the importation into that State of solid
waste from outside that State."' The second provision requires the
EPA to "identify innovative alternative solid waste disposal methods"
and to "establish and publish technical guidance" to implement those
methods.445
Although the short title implies that the bill creates a compact
system such as the one for LLRW,"6 the provisions instead resemble
the comprehensive county waste management system of Fort
Gratiot.447 The laws, however, differ in at least one important way:
the state needs to act affirmatively to exclude waste under H.R. 418. 44
In the county waste management system, the counties needed to act
affirmatively to allow in waste imports. 49 The Supreme Court found
this need for action significant when it concluded that the law in Fort
439. See Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 92.
440. H.R. 418, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1730, 108th Cong. (2003).
441. H.R. 418, 108th Cong.
442. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (2003). The SWDA was amended by RCRA in 1976.
Subtitle D refers to Subtitle D of RCRA. See supra note 70 for more information
about the SWDA and RCRA.
443. H.R. 418, 108th Cong.
444. Id. § 2.
445. Id. § 3.
446. Previously, Representative Kanjorski proposed the Solid Waste Compact Act
of 1993, which contained provisions that allowed states to form compacts to deal with
solid waste on a regional basis and more closely adhered to the model of the
LLRWPA. H.R. 599, 103d Cong. (1993); Weinberg, supra note 86, at 66.
447. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Res., 504
U.S. 353,361 (1992).
448. H.R. 418 § 3. Compare Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361 (describing how counties
under the Michigan law had to act affirmatively to allow out-of-state and out-of-
country waste).
449. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361.
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Gratiot was invalid."' The bill, H.R. 418, was referred to the House
Subcommittee on Environmental and Hazardous Materials on
February 14, 2003, but no further action has been taken.45'
c. H.R. 1730: Solid Waste Interstate Transportation Act of 2003
Representative James Greenwood, a Republican from
Pennsylvania, introduced H.R. 1730 to the House on April 10, 2003.452
This bill is co-sponsored by twenty other representatives from
Nebraska, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, California, Oregon, and
Mississippi.4"3  It has three main provisions. First, it places a
presumptive ban on out-of-state waste unless the waste is received
under a host community agreement, allowed by state permit, or
accepted under an existing contract.454 States could deny permits
based on the lack of local or regional need for more disposal
capacity. 55
Second, the bill allows states to cap the amount of out-of-state
waste that each landfill or incinerator in the state can receive. 456 If
states enact comprehensive recycling programs, they can cap out-of-
state MSW to the amount received at each facility in 1995.457 States
could also limit landfills or incinerators that had been receiving out-
of-state MSW to the amount of out-of-state MSW received in 1993.458
States could further add provisions in the permit limiting the amount
of out-of-state MSW to 20% of the total amount of MSW received at
the disposal facility.459 None of the caps could conflict with the limits
set out under permits and host community agreements, 46° or
discriminate against MSW because of state origin.46'
Third, the bill allows states to impose a "cost recovery surcharge"
much like the one in Oregon Waste Systems.462  The surcharge is
limited to the amount necessary to recover the cost of processing,
combustion, or disposal in the state arising from an out-of-state source
450. Id. at 363, 367-68.
451. H.R. 418, 108th Cong. (2003) (indicating no further actions), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl08query.htnl.
452. H.R. 1730, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://thomas.ioc.gov/bss/dl08query.html.
453. Id. Except for California, all of the other states whose representatives sponsor
the bill receive net imports of MSW. McCarthy & Hardenbergh, supra note 93, at
CRS-6, tbl. 3.
454. H.R. 1730 § 2 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(a)).
455. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(g)(1)).
456. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(h)).
457. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(h)).
458. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(f)(2)).
459. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(g)(2)).
460. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(f)(1)(A), (g)(2)(B), (h)(1)(A)).
461. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(f)(3), (g)(2)(C)(ii), (h)(2)).
462. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(i)).
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and is capped at $2 per ton.463 The fee collected would help fund solid
waste programs administered by the state.46
t.K. 1730 was discussed in a hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Environmental and Hazardous Materials on July 23,
2003, along with two other interstate and international MSW bills.465
The impetus behind the hearing was a looming waste crisis in
Michigan. In 2001, Michigan imported 3,597,729 tons of MSW and
exported 146,358 tons, for a net of 3,451,371 imported tons, making it
the third largest net importer of MSW in the United States.466 About
half of the imported MSW came from the province of Ontario,
Canada, rather than other states in the United States.467 When the
city of Toronto closed its last two landfills in at the end of 2002, it
began to ship all of its MSW to Michigan landfills.4"
Furious at its status as the dumping grounds for Ontario, Michigan
fought to keep out Canadian garbage.469 Several events fueled
Michigan's anger. In October 2002, U.S. customs inspectors at the
border stopped a garbage truck coming into Michigan from Canada
because it was dripping blood.aT On several occasions, most recently
463. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(i)).
464. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4011(i)(3)).
465. Hearing on H.R. 382, H.R. 411, and H.R. 1730 Before the Subcomm. on Env't
and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong.
6-7 (2003) (statement of Robert A. Ficano, Wayne County Executive, Wayne County,
Michigan) [hereinafter Hearing]. H.R. 382 and H.R. 411 addressed waste flow across
the U.S.-Canadian border. Id. at 7. H.R. 382 allowed states to regulate MSW from
outside the United States. Id. H.R. 411 required the EPA to enforce the requirement
that Canada and the United States notify each other about imported waste, and to
consider the impact on states before consenting to the imports. Id.
466. McCarthy & Hardenbergh, supra note 93, at CRS-6, tbl. 3.
467. Id. at CRS-8. Canada imposed a 7% Goods and Services Tax on MSW
disposed of in Canada, further giving Ontario an incentive to dump MSW in
Michigan. Hearing, supra note 465, at 130 (statement of Michael Garfield, Director,
Ecology Center).
468. See Hearing, supra note 465, at 14-15 (statement of Sen. Debbie Stabenow,
Michigan); McCarthy & Hardenbergh, supra note 93, at CRS-8.
469. Heinlein, supra note 30 (describing Michigan's effort to pass interstate waste
flow legislation).
470. Hearing, supra note 465, at 104 (statement of Linda Jordan, Michigan State
Trooper). Ms. Jordan, the state trooper who stopped the truck, testified as follows:
Customs Agent Young advised while he was checking vehicles for illegal
cargo he noticed blood dripping from the trailer of one of the vehicles. He
stated it had created a pool in its previous location and since the vehicle had
been sequestered there was another pool of blood in its new location and
blood continued to drip. The driver of the vehicle stated he was hauling
garbage.
The vehicle trailer had two grates in the back door, one of which was
leaking blood. It was also dripping through the seam between the door and
the bed of the trailer. Agent Young and I climbed to the top of the trailer to
check the contents but the trash was compacted so tightly we were not able
to see the source of the blood. The x-ray performed by Customs agents
onsite revealed a location of density, but was inconclusive.
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in September 2003, radioactive waste was detected in shipments of
Canadian MSW.471 In April 2003, inspectors found fifty pounds of
marijuana in a Canadian garbage truck heading to a Michigan
landfill.472 This discovery was compounded by another drug bust in
September 2003, uncovering 1900 pounds of marijuana in a garbage
truck coming into Michigan from Canada.473
To combat the inflow of out-of-state waste, especially that coming
from Canada, Michigan supported H.R. 1730 as a measure to help the
state manage its waste crisis.474 The House Subcommittee has not
taken any further action on this bill since the hearing in July 2003.475
B. The Waste Crisis Reality: The Results of the LLRWPA and Its
Amendments
The three states with LLRW disposal sites echoed one of the same
concerns as importing MSW states-they did not want to be the
dumping grounds of the nation.476 After a near nuclear meltdown at
Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island in 1979, fear and hatred of
radioactive waste skyrocketed.477 Due to negative public and political
perceptions of radioactive waste, siting new disposal facilities became
more difficult.478  After the closing of the Maxey Flats, Kentucky;
West Valley, New York; and Sheffield, Illinois sites, the Barnwell site
in South Carolina became the only LLRW site available to the eastern
part of the United States and soon began receiving nearly 80% of the
Agent Young and I escorted the vehicle to a waste management recovery
station in Detroit in order to off-load the garbage and find the source of the
blood. The driver of the vehicle pushed approximately a quarter of the
garbage out of the trailer. In this small amount of garbage we found two
garbage bags full of used blood products, partially empty blood transfusion
bags, and intravenous tubing. In addition there was still a large amount of
blood in the bags. The medical waste filled two large clear garbage bags and
then were placed in another yellow garbage bag. The two clear bags were
tied, but the yellow bag was not. None of the waste was in the required red
biohazard bags nor was the vehicle properly marked with biohazard
placards.
Id.
471. Hearing, supra note 465, at 15 (statement of Sen. Debbie Stabenow,
Michigan); Radioactive Toronto Trash Irks Michigan, The Record (Kitchener-
Waterloo, Ont.), Sept. 9, 2003, at A2.
472. Hearing, supra note 465, at 6 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Michigan).
473. Jeremy W. Steele, Pot Discovery Fuels Imported Trash Battle; Ton of
Marijuana Found in Truck; Today Stabenow Will Present Anti-Import Petitions to
EPA Chief, Detroit News, Oct. 1, 2003, at B6.
474. Hearing, supra note 465, at 43-44 (statement of Stephen E. Chester, Director,
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality).
475. H.R. 1730, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl08query.html.
476. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
477. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 46.
478. Id.
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nation's commercial LLRW.479 On the campaign trail, Governor
Richard Riley promised to restore South Carolina's reputation by
ensuring that Barnwell would not become the nation's only dumping
ground for LLRW.48°
Along with the governors of the other two sited states, Nevada and
Washington, Governor Riley pushed Congress to enact the
LLRWPA.48 1 In the first hopeful years following the passage of the
LLRWPA, most states set about finding compact partners.482 Their
progress, however, was deterred by several factors. First, the
negotiation process was much lengthier than anticipated as the
LLRWPA did not prescribe any format for compact agreements.483
States were still negotiating in 1985, perilously close to the January 1,
1986 deadline after which the sited compacts could exclude others
from their facilities.48 Second, the LLRWPA required all states to
take the same steps to assume responsibility for the LLRW generated
in their borders, but not all states generated enough LLRW to justify
devoting their resources to comply with the law.45  Third, LLRW
production began to fall, dimming the need for new disposal sites.486
The Department of Energy ("DOE") published a report
recommending six regional disposal sites for maximum efficiency.
Seven compacts had already formed, however, prompting worries
about overcapacity and site proliferation.4 7
By 1985, thirty-seven states had joined compacts.4" When Congress
enacted the LLRWPAA, it also approved the first seven compact
regions en masse: Central, Central Midwest, Midwest, Northeast
(now called Atlantic), Northwest, Rocky Mountain, and Southeast.489
As LLRW management plans unfolded under the new law's
requirements,49 ° some states left their original compacts to join other
ones, or to become stand-alone states.491 Some of the states, in fact,
were signatories to more than one compact when Congress approved
the first seven compacts en masse.49  Other states did not join
479. Id.
480. See id. at 46-47.
481. Id. at 47.
482. See id. at 48.
483. Id.
484. See Mostaghel, supra note 36, at 396-97.
485. Newberry, supra note 37, at 48.
486. Id. at 49; see also U.S. NRC, Radioactive Waste, supra note 282, at 19.
487. Newberry, supra note 37, at 49 (citing U.S. Dep't of Energy, Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act Report: Response to Public Law 96-573 at 7 (1981)).
488. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
489. See Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1859 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2021d note
(2000); see also infra Table 1: Compacts Approved by Congress in 1986.
490. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 50.
491. Id. at 50-51, 55-56; see also infra Table 1: Compacts Approved By Congress in
1986, Table 2: Current Compacts and Member States.
492. See Mostaghel, supra note 36, at 396-97; see also infra Table 1: Compacts
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compacts at all.493  Congress later approved the Southwestern,
Appalachian, and Texas Compacts, bringing the total number of
compacts to ten.494
1. Siting Under the LLRWPA and the LLRWPAA
As the compacts formalized, each compact commission turned its
attention to developing new LLRW disposal sites by 1993, the year
when Barnwell, Beatty, and Richland could close their doors to
outside LLRW.4 95 None would succeed. Michigan, originally the host
state for the Midwest Compact, tried to dodge its responsibilities by
finding no need for disposal capacity since the other compacts were
siting facilities.496 California, the host state of the Southwest Compact,
had almost succeeded in finding a site in Ward Valley, but was
thwarted in the end by protests from environmental groups and an
endangered species of desert tortoise.4 97 Nebraska, the host state for
the Central Compact, had come close to siting a facility in Boyd
County, but denied the site a permit because of political opposition.4 98
Its official reason was the facility's proximity to wetlands.499 Texas
also was very close to siting a LLRW disposal site in the Hudspeth
County town of Sierra Blanca, but the permit was denied because of
earthquake risks and environmental justice considerations °°
Most of the compacts used a top-down approach to siting."1
Approved By Congress in 1986 (listing the compacts approved in the Omnibus Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act).
493. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Low-Level Waste Compacts, at
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/compacts.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2004); see
also infra Table 2: Current Compacts and Member States.
494. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-240, § 5(a)-(b), 99 Stat. 1842, 1846-47 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2021e (2000)) (establishing the availability of LLRW disposal capacity at Barnwell,
Richland and Beatty).
495. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 55 (describing attempts to find new sites);
supra note 325 and accompanying text.
496. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 55-56.
497. US Ecology, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (referring to Desert Tortoise v. Lujan, a 1993 decision by the Northern District
of California); see also Rabe et al., supra note 354, at 87.
498. Entergy, Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2001). Nebraska
was unhappy that it was chosen to host the LLRW disposal facility. Id. When U.S.
Ecology, the private company chosen to find a disposal site, applied for a license,
Nebraska required it to answer 700 questions before reviewing the application. Id.
Ultimately, Nebraska denied the license after eight years and millions of dollars. Id. at
984.
499. Id. at 983.
500. Randy Lee Loftis, Panel Rejects Nuclear Dump in W. Texas; Earthquake Risk,
Possible Harm to Residents Cited, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 23, 1998, at Al.
501. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 61; see also supra note 356 and accompanying
text. Four of the ten compacts initially used a compensated siting process, but turned
to the top-down approach when no states or communities volunteered. See Been,
supra note 371, at 800-08.
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Although such an approach was technically fair and used scientific
and technological criteria to choose sites, the communities selected to
host LLRW fai it'ie- wer not pleased. 5 2 Thc orinal s L
were chosen successfully using the top-down approach, but this
preceded the anti-nuclear sentiment following the events at Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl." 3 Three of these sites were chosen
personally by an entrepreneur, Frederick Beierle, using no technical
criteria at all.5 4 Although siting had been more easily accomplished
in the past, it usually resulted in damage to the environment because
the site selectors gave little thought to the possibility of contamination
or pollution of nearby natural resources.0 5 For example, the Richland
site is located near the Columbia River and the Barnwell site is near
the Savannah River, raising the risk of water contamination.506 Siting
decisions were based on business considerations,5 7 expediency, 08 or
even arbitrary personal preferences for certain locations.9
Perhaps another factor that contributed to the failure of siting
LLRW disposal facilities510 was that the shallow land burial technique
employed by disposal sites has not always been effective.' The West
Valley, Maxey Flats and Sheffield sites have all resulted in
contamination. 2  The environmental reputation of the original
LLRW disposal sites negatively impacts the siting process by raising
the perception of risk associated with such sites.513 The lack of
502. Newberry, supra note 37, at 63.
503. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1138. Operating errors caused
both the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania and the
1986 explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the former Soviet Union. Malcolm
W. Browne, In West, After Anxiety, No Major Technical Changes in Industry, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 26, 1987, at 1. The Three Mile Island accident did not claim any lives, but
many people were exposed to radiation, raising fears of cancer risks. Id. Thirty-one
people died in the Chernobyl accident and many more were exposed to radiation. Id.
Both of these accidents contributed to public fears of nuclear power. Id.
504. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1092; Newberry, supra note 37,
at 46.
505. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1093.
506. See id. at 1091-93.
507. Id. at 1090-91 (noting that developers considered "proximity to markets and
materials, availability of labor, transportation, utilities and infrastructure, and low
land and development costs" when making siting decisions).
508. Id. at 1091-92 (describing how war time pressures allowed the development of
a plutonium production facility on the banks of the Columbia River in Washington).
509. Id. (pointing out that the Los Alamos National Laboratory was picked as a
nuclear laboratory site because of its scenic view).
510. See id. at 1137-46 (describing how nuclear disasters caused public opposition
to siting radioactive waste facilities because of fear and mistrust).
511. Branson, supra note 38, at 523-24.
512. Id. The Richland and Beatty sites have experienced fewer problems because
of their location in "arid regions." The Barnwell site has avoided problems by having
"porous soil underlying the burial trenches" to allow water to drain out. Id. at 526
n.73.
513. See Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1137-46 (describing reasons
for public opposition to siting radioactive waste facilities).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
advances in technology may also hurt the siting process.514 Although
the LLRWPAA required the NRC to develop alternate disposal
methods for LLRW,5 15 disposal sites continue to use the same shallow
land burial technique, which has not protected against contamination
in the past.516
2. Current Status of the LLRW Compact System
In the end, the Barnwell and Richland sites remained open.517 In
1991, they were joined by the Envirocare of Utah, Inc. site, which
received a license to accept the least hazardous type of LLRW at its
hazardous waste facility.518 Richland currently only accepts LLRW
from the Northwest and Rocky Mountain Compacts.519 Barnwell will
accept LLRW from the rest of the nation until 2008 when it will only
take waste from the Atlantic Compact. 20
South Carolina joined the Atlantic Compact in 2000521 after first
being part of the Southeast Compact. In the Southeast Compact,
North Carolina was to replace South Carolina as host of the region's
LLRW disposal facility.522 North Carolina, however, was never able
to site a new facility and eventually withdrew from the Southeast
Compact, fueling South Carolina's own withdrawal to become a
stand-alone state.5 3 Surcharges at South Carolina's Barnwell site
514. See Branson, supra note 38, at 522, 524.
515. 42 U.S.C. § 2021h (2000).
516. U.S. NRC, Radioactive Waste, supra note 282, at 27 (noting that Barnwell and
Richland use shallow land burial technology).
517. Id. at 26. Both are run by private operators: Chem-Nuclear runs the Barnwell
site and U.S. Ecology runs the Richland site. Melita Marie Garza, ComEd May Be
Left Holding Its Low-Level Nuclear Waste; Only Available Dump Expected to Reject
It, Chi. Trib., May 24, 2000, at 1. The Richland site is located on a portion of the U.S.
Department of Energy's Hanford site in Washington State. See Robert Reinhold, A
Test Case for Nuclear Disposal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1994, at A8; Hanford Site Tours
Website, at http://www.hanford.gov/tours/ecology.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2004). The
NRC refers to the Washington site as Hanford. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Locations of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities, at
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/locations.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
518. Jo Mannies & Robert L. Koenig, New Utah Facility Offers Option for Waste at
Lambert, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 17, 1991, at A3; see Charles Seabrook, Science
Watch: The Leftovers Nobody Wants; Georgia Now Sends Its Low-Level Nuclear
Wastes to South Carolina for Disposal, Atlanta J.-Const., Dec. 19, 1999, at C4 (noting
that the Utah dump accepts only the least radioactive type of LLRW-Type A).
519. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Locations of Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal Facilities, at http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/locations.html (last
visited Apr. 5, 2004).
520. Id.
521. See Atlantic Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact
Implementation Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-46-10 to 48-46-90 (Law Co-op. Supp.
2003).




have increased dramatically, from the cap of $40 per cubic foot in 1992
under the LLWRPAA 524 to over $300 per cubic foot. 525
The LLRWPA and its Amendments handed over the reins of the
Garbage Wars to South Carolina, Nevada and Washington by giving
them the ability to exclude LLRW from outside their regional
compacts.526 It also, however, made the sited states wait to use this
power until their fellow states had a chance to create new regional
disposal sites through the interstate compact system.527  The
LLRWPAA kept the facilities open to the nation until December 31,
1992, but allowed these states to add surcharges to their tipping fees
starting in 1986.528 Although none of the compacts were able to site
new facilities by the December 31, 1992 deadline, the sited states
acted. The Beatty site closed its doors on December 31, 1992.529 The
Richland site remained open only to compact states as of 1993.530 The
Barnwell site was closed except to the Southeast Compact states in
1994.53' By 1995, Barnwell was again open to the nation and withdrew
from the Compact following North Carolina's reluctance to be the
new host for a LLRW facility.5 32 The Barnwell site will again close its
doors in 2008 to states outside the Atlantic Compact.533
Most of the compacts have halted their search for new disposal sites
and continue to rely on the remaining open facilities.534 With the
closing of Barnwell, states will need to find a new place to dispose of
their LLRW since the Envirocare site in Utah only takes the least
hazardous types of LLRW.535 States face inordinate pressure to find
alternative solutions as half of the nation's nuclear power plants will
be shut down in the next thirty years and their waste will have
nowhere to go.53 6 States faced this dilemma before, when Barnwell
524. Branson, supra note 38, at 535 (detailing the rates set out in the LLRWPAA).
525. The Atlantic Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact,
SC Budget and Control Board Approves New Disposal Rates Effective June 1, 2003
(stating that rates range from $250 to $375 per cubic foot), available at
http://www.atlanticcompact.org/rates.htm.
526. See supra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
527. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
528. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
529. Julie Anderson, U.S. Ecology's Parent Calls Nevada Waste Site's Transfer a
Success, Omaha World-Herald, Jan. 7, 1998, at 11.
530. Tom Meersman, Waste Woes; NSP, Others Face Stockpiling of Material as
Dumps Shut Down, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St.Paul), July 4, 1994, at B1.
531. Id.
532. See Seabrook, supra note 518.
533. See supra notes 520-21 and accompanying text.
534. See Murray & Spence, supra note 77, at 95; Rabe et al., supra note 354, at 80.
535. See supra note 518 and accompanying text. Envirocare is currently trying to
get a license to accept all types of LLRW. See Seabrook, supra note 518.
536. Janet Wilson & Seema Mehta, Nucleus of a Dilemma: Reactors Closing as
Disposal Sites Wane, L.A. Times, Mar. 2, 2003, at B6.
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shut down in 1994.537 They reacted by reducing the number of items
that were exposed to radioactivity and by compacting debris.53
Now, generators of LLRW are preparing for on-site storage as a
temporary stop-gap solution.539 States are also turning to private
waste management businesses in the hopes that they will be able to
successfully site new facilities where interstate compact commissions
have failed.54 For example, Envirocare, a private waste management
company, was able to become the newest LLRW facility in 1991 while
the compacts were all unsuccessful in developing new facilities.541
Texas is now pursuing the private development approach. After
failing to site a LLRW facility in Sierra Blanca, Texas passed a bill in
2003 that authorized the creation of a privately-run LLRW dump
under state license.542
The results of the LLRWPA and its Amendments have been rife
with failure. In the twenty or so years since the laws were enacted, no
new LLRW facilities have been developed through the once-
promising interstate compact system. The laws, however, did prevent
the drastic scenario of having no LLRW disposal facilities. The
Richland site still remains open and provides disposal capacity to two
interstate compacts. The Barnwell site also remains open and
provides disposal capacity to the rest of the nation until 2008. Thus,
the laws merely postponed the LLRW disposal crisis by keeping
facilities open rather than addressing the underlying problem of siting
new facilities.
III. PREDICTING THE FUTURE OF INTERSTATE WASTE LAWS
Although the sited states were able to win the LLRW Garbage
Wars by excluding other states from their disposal facilities, the
victory was bittersweet. They still remained the dumping grounds of
537. Garza, supra note 517.
538. See Meersman, supra note 530.
539. See id.
540. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 58 (recommending private waste disposal site
developers as being more effective than public developers). Private developers, such
as the one in California, have generally been more successful at siting than states, but
can still be thwarted by NIMBY activism. See id. at 58-59.
541. Joby Warrick, A Dump's Murky Deals; Nuclear Waste Facility Paid Regulator,
Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1998, at Al. Envirocare, however, has been rocked by scandals
such as fraud and employing an unlicensed engineer. See id.
542. Matt Stiles, West Texas Sees a Waste Opportunity; Desperate for Jobs, Town
Looks Past Hazards in Nuclear Dump Plan, Dallas Morning News, July 12, 2003, at
Al (describing Waste Control Specialists' efforts to court residents for its planned
LLRW dump); Terrence Stutz, Senate Approves Dump, Sets Limit for Low-Level
Radioactive Waste, Dallas Morning News, May 8, 2003, at A5 (describing passage of
Texas bill allowing the creation of a privately-run LLRW dump). Compare Been,
supra note 371, at 800-08 (describing how interstate compact commissions failed to
site LLRW disposal sites even when using compensation plans).
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the nation.543 Millions of dollars were spent and years were wasted in
the search for new disposal sites, with no results.5" There was a small
silver lining-states were forced to find alternatives for their LLRW,
such as source reduction and compacting methods;545 in addition, the
sited states could charge hefty surcharges for their troubles.546
The LLRW crisis sheds light on possible ways to approach states'
concerns in the MSW crisis. It is a starker and more powerful crisis
than MSW. LLRW, depending on its level of radioactivity, is
extremely dangerous;547 the disposal sites are less technologically
developed than MSW sites and must be monitored for hundreds of
years.548 What is more, there are only three disposal sites available.549
MSW, in contrast, is not as feared.' MSW disposal sites are
numerous551 and are constructed under strict standards promulgated
by the EPA. 2 Part III extracts lessons from the results of the
LLRWPA and the LLRWPAA that can be used by states as they
continue to wage the Garbage Wars in the search for legislation that
will allow state control of interstate MSW flow. Part III then
evaluates H.R. 418 and H.R. 1730, two interstate waste flow bills
currently before the 108th Congress, using the lessons from the
LLRW context.553 Lastly, Part III proposes interstate waste flow
legislation that incorporates the lessons from the LLRWPA and
LLRWPAA, and applies such legislation to the modern American
waste disposal crisis.
A. Lessons from the LLRWPA and LLRWPAA
The LLRWPA and its Amendments provide valuable insight for
future congressional solutions to the Garbage Wars. Specifically, the
aftermath of these laws highlight the need to address siting problems,
the role of state pride and equity in waste disposal wars, and the
desirability of alternative disposal methods.
543. See supra notes 517-20 and accompanying text.
544. See supra notes 495-500 and accompanying text.
545. See supra note 538 and accompanying text. This may, however, have been at
the expense of medical research. See O'Toole, supra note 306.
546. See supra notes 524-25 and accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
548. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 517-20 and accompanying text.
550. See Ain, supra note 63 (describing a town's willingness to open up an old
MSW landfill for reclamation).
551. See Weinberg, supra note 86, at 58 (noting that despite landfill closures, 364
new landfills opened between 1986 and 1991).
552. See supra notes 74, 78 and accompanying text.




1. The Problem of Siting
The most striking dilemma that followed the enactment of the
LLRWPA and its Amendments was the problem of siting. 4
Although each regional compact and some of the unaffiliated states
took steps to follow the directive of the LLRWPAA to site new
facilities, none of them were ultimately successful because of powerful
opposition from communities, state governments, and environmental
groups. 5  Despite the law's attempt to get around NIMBY by
requiring states to take responsibility for their LLRW, NIMBY
popped up in a different context. Rather than a national NIMBY, the
phenomenon occurred on a smaller scale, such as within a regional
compact (e.g., the Central and Southeast Compacts), or within a state
(e.g., California and Texas). 6
The top-down approach 557 that states used for siting LLRW
facilities also contributed to the failure of the LLRWPAA to develop
new disposal capacity. Such an approach triggers territoriality
instincts, 558 and raises barriers between developers and communities
that prevent the creation of workable solutions for needed facilities.
The current move to private solutions is a step in the right direction,
as a private developer can more successfully work with communities
through the compensated siting mechanism.559
The modern siting process (using the public participation model and
compensation schemes), although often unsuccessful,"6 is still better
than the method used to site the original six LLRW facilities.561 Those
LLRW facilities were sited without considering adverse
environmental impacts, and led to disastrous leaking and
contamination.5 62  The long period of time needed to site facilities,
however, increases the negative environmental impacts from older
and less safely constructed waste disposal sites while the nation waits
for newer, safer disposal options.563
554. See supra note 333 and accompanying text (describing how the LLRWPA and
its Amendments failed to create more disposal capacity).
555. See supra notes 496-500 and accompanying text.
556. See supra notes 496-500 and accompanying text.
557. See supra note 501 and accompanying text.
558. See supra Part I.D.3.
559. See supra notes 540-42 and accompanying text.
560. See Been, supra note 371, at 824 (noting that while "[n]o compensated siting
program has been a 'success' in getting LULUs sited ... neither has any other siting
program").
561. See supra notes 503-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the top-
down method as used for nuclear facilities.
562. See supra notes 503-12 and accompanying text.
563. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1052.
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2. State Pride and National Equity
State pride and equity issues were the impetus for the LLRPWA
and its Amendments." South Carolina, Nevada and Washington, the
three states with LLRW disposal sites, did not want to be the nuclear
dumping grounds for the nation. 65 By threatening to shut down their
disposal facilities, they were granted the power to control LLRW
imports through an interstate compact system.5 66 Congress addressed
the state pride issue by leaving the structure of the compact system
entirely up to the states, allowing them to make individual choices
about siting new facilities. 67 Congress addressed the equity issue by
delegating responsibility to each state for its own waste. 68
Paradoxically, both state pride and equity contributed to the
downfall of the compact system. None of the other states wanted to
be dumping grounds either, and the chosen host states, such as
Michigan, North Carolina, and Nebraska, proved reluctant to fulfill
their duties under the compact agreements . 69 This was not only a
phenomenon at the national and regional levels, but also at the state
level. California and Texas made good faith efforts to find new
LLRW disposal sites, but were thwarted in the final stages of the
siting process because of opposition from environmental groups and
communities. v
Congress, however, may not have succeeded if it had taken the
opposite approach and dictated the placement of new regional
facilities, as it did for HLRW 7' Congress selected the Yucca
Mountain site as the nation's sole repository for HLRW in the 1980s,
but the site has not yet opened due to public outcry over safety and
environmental impacts. 2 Despite the Yucca Mountain project's
current difficulties resulting from Congress's high-handed approach to
siting for HLRW, Congress could still have adopted measures to ease
the path for states to work together cooperatively to develop disposal
capacity for LLRW.5 73
The compact system took some time to get off the ground because
of lengthy negotiations. 7 " Congress could have provided some
guidance to states by creating uniform standards for compact
564. See supra notes 302-14 and accompanying text.
565. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
566. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
567. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
568. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
569. See supra notes 496, 498, 522-23 and accompanying text.
570. See supra notes 497, 500 and accompanying text.
571. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
572. See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
573. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 48.
574. See supra notes 483-84 and accompanying text.
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agreements.575  In addition, Congress could have preemptively
anticipated NIMBY problems by encouraging states to be more open
about the site selection process and educating the public about
LLRW.5 76 After all, anti-nuclear sentiment and the perceived risks
from LLRW blocked the development of new sites under the top-
down selection model.5 7
3. Alternative Solutions
The lack of new disposal capacity, combined with the ability of
states to exclude outside LLRW under the LLRWPA and its
Amendments, encouraged states to embrace alternative disposal
methods. LLRW generators scrambled to find creative ways to deal
with their waste when the sited states were finally able to exclude out-
of-state LLRW.5 78 They cut down on the amount of material that was
exposed to radioactivity and compacted waste to reduce volume.579 In
contrast, the LLRWPAA provisions for the NRC to develop
alternative disposal methods failed. 8
Because the Barnwell site will soon be closed to states outside the
Northeast Compact,58' states are finding new ways to approach the
siting process. States such as Texas are now seeking private
solutions. 2 By hiring a private business to find new disposal sites
rather than giving the responsibility to an unwilling host state,
compacts can avoid some of the state pride and equity issues that
blocked previous siting efforts.5 83
These three lessons shed some light on what legislators should
consider in proposing new laws that would allow states to control
interstate MSW. As the LLRWPA and its Amendments show,
gaining the power to exclude waste imports by itself will not be a
satisfactory way for importing states to win the Garbage Wars.
Underlying issues such as siting, equity, and disposal alternatives must
also be addressed. In Parts III.B. and III.C., this Note analyzes H.R.
418 and H.R. 1730, recent interstate waste bills in front of the 108th
Congress, for their utilization of these principles.
575. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 48 (noting that the LLRWPA "did not require
any particular configuration" for compacts).
576. See Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1146-51.
577. See supra notes 501-16 and accompanying text.
578. See supra notes 536-40 and accompanying text.
579. See Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1189 (finding that the
increased price of LLRW disposal has cut LLRW generation by more than half).
580. 42 U.S.C. § 2021h (2000); see also supra text accompanying notes 515-16.
581. See supra note 520 and accompanying text.
582. See supra note 542 and accompanying text.
583. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 58 (noting that private companies were in a
better position to work with the public to site facilities).
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B. Assessing H.R. 418
H.R. 4-18 would give states with approved waste management plans
the ability to exclude MSW imports."s8 This provision is similar to the
measure in the LLRWPA that gives states the freedom to create their
own arrangements under an interstate compact system.585 Under H.R.
418, however, each state would represent one compact region.586 As
with the LLRW compact system, importing states may be afraid that if
their waste management plan is not approved, they could become the
next dumping ground for the nation. Thus, importing states will likely
try to get approval for their plans as soon as possible, in a race to
exclude their fellow states. The prohibition on MSW imports is likely
to be reciprocated, making states responsible for their own waste since
they will only be able to dispose of it in-state. The onus will be on
states to site new landfills when their current disposal space becomes
full.
Banning or severely limiting MSW imports may have an unwanted
side effect. Many of the larger, newer regional landfills are developed
by private businesses, and depend on large volumes of waste from
other states to remain operational. 87 These companies will no longer
want to find sites in states that place stringent controls on interstate
waste flow.58 8 States will thus have to develop their own landfills and
face the NIMBY issue on a smaller, more local scale. This provision
of H.R. 418 could pit sited communities against the rest of their state,
raising issues of territoriality and equity. This will be especially
problematic for exporting states, which are usually more densely
populated than importing states and have less space available for
landfills.
H.R. 418's second provision promotes alternative disposal methods
for MSW.5 89  The LLRWPAA contained a similar provision to
promote alternatives to shallow land burial for LLRW.59 ° This
provision, however, had little effect and disposal sites continue to use
584. See supra note 444 and accompanying text.
585. See supra notes 315-18 and accompanying text for a summary of the interstate
compact system.
586. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (allowing compacts to form
between several states).
587. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
588. See supra Part I.B. (detailing several cases where waste management
companies brought suit to invalidate state laws controlling interstate waste flow
because such laws hurt their businesses).
589. In the MSW context, several alternative disposal methods have already been
developed, including source reduction, recycling, and composting. See U.S. EPA,
MSW 2000, supra note 33, at 105 (listing source reduction, recycling, and composting
as alternatives to incineration and landfilling).
590. 42 U.S.C. § 2021h (2000).
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the shallow land burial technique.591  Rather, states turned to
alternative disposal methods for LLRW only out of necessity.
592
Alternative disposal methods cannot handle an entire state's waste
stream alone. For example, only 26.7% of MSW was recycled in
2002.191 For LLRW, alternative disposal methods also did not
eliminate the need for disposal capacity. LLRW generators were able
to reduce the amount of material that needed disposal, but also had to
use on-site storage as a temporary measure while waiting for new
LLRW disposal sites to open.594
H.R. 418, thus, would fall into the same pitfalls as the LLRWPA.
By allowing states to ban MSW imports, the bill creates national
equity. At the same time, however, H.R. 418 exacerbates the MSW
crisis by requiring states to site their own landfills at a substantial cost,
and in the face of more local NIMBYs. The alternative disposal
method provision of H.R. 418 is laudable for its forward-thinking
qualities, but it cannot be a complete solution on its own.
Alternatives to land disposal do not erase the need for new landfill
space, and states will not adopt new disposal methods until absolutely
necessary. Ultimately, H.R. 418 fails because it does not adequately
address the siting problem.
C. Assessing H.R. 1730
H.R. 1730 gives states the ability to ban out-of-state waste, but
avoids the problems arising in H.R. 418 by providing two exceptions.
First, the bill would allow landfills sited under host agreements to
accept out-of-state MSW. Under this exception, private waste
management companies would be encouraged to develop large
regional facilities because they would be able to receive enough waste
to function.595 This approach promotes the use of compensated siting,
one of the more successful techniques in siting.596 Because the
communities volunteer to host the landfill, there is no issue of
community pride. The community's willingness to participate
indicates that there is no perception of an unfair burden.
Another provision of H.R. 1730 would give states the ability to cap
the amount of out-of-state waste accepted by each landfill in three
different ways.597 If a state has a comprehensive recycling program, it
591. See supra text accompanying notes 515-16.
592. See supra notes 536-38 and accompanying text.
593. Scott M. Kaufman et al., The State of Garbage in America, BioCycle, Jan.
2004, at 31, 36.
594. See supra note 539 and accompanying text.
595. See supra notes 587-8F and accompanying text (analyzing the impact on
private landfill developers under H.R. 418).
596. See Been, supra note 371, at 791.
597. See supra notes 456-61 and accompanying text.
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can cap the amount of out-of-state MSW to 1995 levels.59 This
provides an incentive for states to recycle. The incentive, however,
may be minimal, as states can add a percentage cap as a provision in
its permit or can cap at 1993 levels for facilities that had been
receiving out-of-state waste before the enactment of the bill.599 Under
the percentage cap provision, the cap ensures that facilities cannot
primarily accept out-of-state waste. The cap may even cause waste
management companies to spread out-of-state waste between several
of their landfills for a more equitable distribution. The caps, however,
may unintentionally prohibit regional landfills, similar to the scenario
in Gilmore.6' If the effect is too draconian, landfill developers may
choose not to site regional landfills in that state. Thus, the problem of
siting may still exist at the state level.
Lastly, H.R. 1730 allows states to add a cost recovery surcharge to
their tipping fees. The surcharge is capped at $2 per ton.61 As Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted in Oregon Waste Systems, which had a
similarly low surcharge of $2.25 per ton, the surcharge is a small price
to pay for garbage disposal.6°2 This surcharge allows states to make
MSW importers pay their fair share and addresses equity concerns.
H.R. 1730 thus addresses all three of the issues that arose under
LLRWPA and its Amendments. The bill anticipates the siting
dilemma by encouraging voluntary, compensated siting arrangements
by private waste management companies. The bill addresses the pride
issue by giving communities the choice of whether they would like to
host a landfill and thus voluntarily accept the attendant risks and
reputation. The bill also considers equity issues by providing for caps
on out-of-state waste and allowing cost recovery surcharges. It also
encourages the development of recycling programs, although the
incentive behind this provision is weak because states can use other
methods to cap MSW imports besides establishing recycling programs.
H.R. 1730, however, has two main weaknesses. First, if there are no
volunteers to host MSW facilities, the bill's provisions for
compensated siting will be for naught.6"3 The bill's cap and permit
provisions also undermine the bill's ability to fully address these three
issues by allowing overly stringent limits on interstate waste flow6 °4
598. See supra note 457 and accompanying text (discussing the cap provision under
H.R. 1730).
599. See supra notes 458-59 and accompanying text.
600. See supra text accompanying notes 229-54 (describing the landfill cap
provision in Gilmore).
601. See supra note 463 and accompanying text.
602. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 109 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
603. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
604. Hearing, supra note 465, at 141 (statement of Robert Orlin, Deputy
Commissioner, New York City Sanitation Department) (describing how H.R. 1730




despite statutory language prohibiting the cap from discriminating
against MSW based on its origin6°5  and conflicting with host
agreements. 6  Thus, H.R. 1730 can still create siting problems at the
local level. 7
D. Proposing New Interstate Waste Flow Legislation
A workable interstate waste flow bill needs to address the siting
issue, first and foremost. This reverses the approach taken by the
LLRWPA and the LLRWPAA, in which Congress catered to state
concerns. 608 By addressing siting first, the proposed bill will also target
the state pride and alternative disposal method issues.
The proposed bill should encourage private development of
regional facilities and compensated siting by allowing host
agreements. Although this approach failed due to lack of volunteers
in the LLRW context, 6°9 it is more promising than the top-down
approach. Unlike H.R. 1730, the proposed bill should provide that
host agreements cannot be fettered by caps on the amount of waste
that can be received from out-of-state. States, however, will be
unhappy with this provision because they will not be able to control
the waste inflow of hosted facilities. In the dormant Commerce
Clause cases, states passed laws to control the behavior of the private
waste management companies that developed regional facilities
because such facilities received the bulk of out-of-state waste.61°
To address states' desires to control interstate waste flow, states
should be allowed to ban or limit MSW from publicly owned and
operated landfills, tracking the market participant exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause. In addition, the private development
schemes should involve states as well as local communities and
environmental groups. In the LLRW context, the compensated siting
approach failed because states, communities, and environmental
groups successfully fought the plans of private companies seeking to
develop waste facilities.611 Giving these parties a voice in the process
may help combat the territoriality instinct by allowing discussion
about the health benefits of more modern, safer landfills built to
higher environmental standards, as well as the economic benefits from
newly created jobs.612
605. See supra text accompanying note 461.
606. See supra text accompanying note 460.
607. See supra note 556 and accompanying text.
608. See supra text accompanying note 319.
609. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
610. See supra Part I.B.
611. See supra notes 496-500 and accompanying text.
612. See Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1122, 1146-49, 1152
(describing the harm caused by "old, substandard" facilities and explaining ways to
reduce public opposition to siting).
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To address state territoriality, the proposed bill should include
uniform national provisions to govern the host agreement process. A
standardized process will allow communities and states to make sure
that host agreements are fair. Standardization will deter states from
abusing their regulatory powers while also allowing them to have a
role in the siting process.
In addition, the proposed bill should provide information to the
public about the type and amounts of waste that are being imported
and exported. If states see that they are not the only dumping
grounds because they export their hazardous waste to another state,
but receive MSW from out-of-state, their perceptions of inequity will
diminish.6"3 States may also feel mollified if they compared the
amount of MSW flowing in from out-of-state to the amount of MSW
generated in-state. If the waste going into landfills mainly comes from
in-state, then the perception of inequity lessens.
Lastly, the proposed bill should encourage states to use alternative
disposal methods. The best way to achieve this goal is to allow states
to raise tipping fees. In the LLRW and hazardous waste contexts,
raising tipping fees encouraged waste generators to turn to disposal
alternatives. States, however, should not be allowed to raise fees with
the practical effect of banning imported MSW. Allowing this effect
would lead to the result of the LLRWPA and its Amendments by
merely postponing the seriousness of disposal problem until the
blockaded landfill becomes full. Instead, the proposed bill should
allow states to uniformly raise the price of MSW land disposal,
perhaps capped by increments set out in the bill. The fee 614 can be
used to fund the development of alternative waste disposal
methods.615 Although this fee would make waste disposal more
expensive overall, such a fee would be equitable because it would be
applied uniformly to the nation. This fee, however, may not be
effective if a state's existing tipping fee is already low.
The proposed bill starts by targeting siting and contains more finely
tuned provisions to address state pride, equity, and disposal
alternatives. By supporting compensated siting and giving states the
power to administer standardized siting regulations and raise tipping
fees, the bill acknowledges state pride concerns, while still placing
emphasis on the primary problem of siting. Like other proposed laws,
this bill still remains vulnerable to a state's instinct of territoriality. To
address this issue, the proposed bill uses education to counter
misperceptions of inequity.
613. See supra notes 399-402 and accompanying text.
614. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
615. Such a fee-based incentive can also create the impetus for states to turn to




E. Caveat: Why the MSW Scenario May Be Different
In the end, the dire results of the LLRWPA and its Amendments
do not necessitate a gloomy future for interstate MSW. There are
several differences between MSW and LLRW that may make state
control of interstate MSW a success. First, LLRW involved only state
players until 1991 when Envirocare of Utah, Inc. came on the scene.616
The compacts have only recently turned to private players to help
manage LLRW disposal. MSW, on the other hand, already involves
private players. The dormant Commerce Clause cases indicate that a
large amount of out-of-state waste is disposed of at large privately
owned and operated regional facilities, and control over interstate
waste imports will disproportionately affect the owners of those larger
facilities.617
Second, MSW is much less feared than LLRW-thus, siting an
MSW landfill is easier. LLRW must be isolated for hundreds of years
or more, making it a much more expensive and long-term waste.618
MSW landfills, on the other hand, can be reused as golf courses, parks
and other kinds of attractive spaces.619 Furthermore, the technology
for MSW landfills has improved over time.62 LLRW disposal, in
contrast, still uses the shallow land burial technique that has
historically been unsuccessful in protecting against radioactive
contamination of groundwater.62'
Third, nearly every state has MSW landfills.6 2 In the LLRW
scenario, only three states had disposal sites, and only six facilities in
total were necessary. 623 Thus, it was difficult to satisfy the demands of
equity because the great majority of the states would not be burdened
by a nuclear waste dump.624 To further assuage equity concerns, many
states have environmental justice statutes that may help ensure a
fairer siting process within the state.625
616. Although it would seem that state players would fall under the market
participant exception, the Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument in Spellman.
Because the prohibition in that case was designed to stop LLRW at Washington's
borders, and not from the specific disposal site, it was market regulating rather than
participatory. Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627,
631 (9th Cir. 1982).
617. See supra Part I.B.1.-6.
618. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
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620. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
621. See supra note 516 and accompanying text.
622. Nora Goldstein & Celeste Madtes, The State of Garbage in America,
BioCycle, Dec. 2001, at 42, 48. The District of Columbia lacks its own landfill and
information on the number of landfills in Montana was unavailable. Id.
623. See Newberry, supra note 37, at 49.
624. See Gerrard, Fear and Loathing, supra note 47, at 1206 (describing how the
free rider problem was a major reason for the failure of siting for LLRW disposal).




Throughout the ages, waste disposal crises have continually plagued
civilizations. The modern American waste disposal crisis stems from
worries about dwindling disposal capacity, as well as issues of state
pride, health, environmental protection, and equity. Prodded by the
regionalization of the waste disposal market, the current crisis gave
rise to the Garbage Wars. This series of contentious brawls between
garbage-importing and garbage-exporting states has to date been
fought in state legislatures and the courts. Importing states have long
attempted to gain control over interstate MSW flow by enacting state
laws that ban or limit MSW imports. Courts, however, have
consistently struck down such measures under the rubric of the
dormant Commerce Clause.
In the analogous LLRW crisis, Congress granted states the
authority to control interstate LLRW waste flow through a regional
compact system under the LLRWPA and its Amendments. Although
this move forestalled a LLRW version of the Garbage Wars, it did not
remove the conflict. The battles merely shifted to more local arenas,
such as states within regional compacts and communities within the
states picked to host LLRW disposal sites. Although the LLRWPA
and its Amendments did not abate the crisis, they did marginally
benefit states by forcing them to turn to alternative disposal methods
such as source reduction.
The LLRW saga suggests that importing states should not yet be
granted the victor's prize. Until states can adequately address the
difficulties of siting, any congressionally sanctioned scheme that gives
them the ability to exclude out-of-state MSW will likely fail. A more
workable solution may be to provide states with information that
counters their perceptions of being a dumping ground for the rest of
the nation, and to give states a limited role in the siting of regional
facilities. To truly win the Garbage Wars, states must also turn to
alternative disposal methods such as source reduction, recycling, and
composting to address the waste disposal crisis head-on.
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Table 1: Compacts Approved By Congress in 1986
(Source: Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate
Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1859 (1986))
COMPACT MEMBER STATES
NAME
Arkansas Missouri (also in Midwest)
Central Iowa (also in Midwest) Nebraska
Louisiana North Dakota
Minnesota (also in Midwest) Oklahoma
Central Illinois Kentucky
Midwest
Indiana Minnesota (also in Central)
Midwest Michigan Missouri (also in Central)
Ohio Wisconsin
Iowa (also in Central)
Northeast Connecticut Maryland
(Atlantic) Delaware New Jersey
Alaska Oregon
Utah (also in Rocky
Northwest Hawaii Mountain)
Idaho Washington
Wyoming (also in Rocky
Montana Mountain)
Arizona New Mexico
Rocky Colorado Utah (also in Northwest)
Mountain Wyoming (also in
Nevada Northwest)
Alabama North Carolina












Table 2: Current Compacts and Member States
















Connecticut (host state)(Atlantic) New Jersey (host state)
South Carolina
Alaska Oregon















District of Columbia New York (will host)
Massachusetts (will host) Puerto Rico
Michigan (will host) North Carolina (will host)
New Hampshire
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